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 Abstract 
At the end of the nineteenth century, seismologists were trying to create a 
‘universal’ seismology that could be applied worldwide. Applying the 
observational European techniques in various places across the world challenged 
scientists to reassess their methodologies, epistemologies, and evidential criteria 
as they realized that their methods, developed in early nineteenth century Europe, 
were inadequate for reading earthquake damage outside of Europe. Their 
decisions were directed by cultural as much as by physical considerations.  
Richard Dixon Oldham, a geologist working in Colonial India, used his position 
as a colonial scientist to argue for an instrumental turn in seismology, which 
privileged seismograph inscriptions over fieldwork and public observations. 
Embedded in this shift was the invisibility of the colonized peoples’ experiences 
and knowledge. There was no established, standardized instrumental seismology 
to transition to, which indicates that seismologists believed that unreliable 
instruments were less problematic than unreliable people. The instrumental turn in 
seismology was a very deliberate, contested change, and colonial considerations 
played a critical role in this shift. 
1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 On June 12th, 1897, about 5:15 in the afternoon, northeast India was 
suddenly jolted by an earthquake. The epicenter was located somewhere in the 
Garo Hills, a group of hills just south of the Himalayas. Modern seismologists 
estimate the earthquake's magnitude to be about 8.0, and until that time, the 
earthquake was one of the most violent on record. An area about 8,000 square 
miles, roughly the size of Montenegro, was immediately devastated, with 
landslides stripping hills of soil, fissures opening and erupting sand and water, 
hills changing their elevation by several feet, and riverbanks subsiding, causing 
extensive flooding. Every stone or brick-built building within this radius 
immediately collapsed into a heap, and within a 31,000-square mile area, the 
buildings sustained at least substantial damage. In Calcutta, 230 miles away, 
residents watched as their homes split down the middle and swayed violently. The 
earthquake was felt over at least 1,750,000 square miles, about half the size of 
Europe.1 Fortunately, most of the population was out of doors at the time, so the 
death rate was low relative to the violence of the quake. The official report puts 
the number of deaths at 1,542, which is undoubtedly too low because it was a 
conservative estimate that did not take into account deaths in other countries that 
would have been affected by the shock, such as Nepal.2 Across India, the shocks 
                                                 
1 Charles Davison, Great Earthquakes (London: Thomas Murby & Co., 1936), 
142. 
2 Report on the Administration of Assam for the Year 1897-98 (Shillong: Printed 




started elephant stampedes, knocked horses off their feet, and killed several fish 
and dolphins, whose bodies floated en masse on the Brahmaputra River that runs 
through the center of the Assam lowlands.3 Few of the bodies of human casualties 
could be recovered, as many were buried in landslides or pulled into the 
Brahmaputra. For days, aftershocks continued to rock Assam.  
The earthquake had damaged the water and food reserves, and unchecked 
disease affected many of the survivors.4 The earthquake also damaged the 
colonial transportation and communication systems. The government of India 
rushed to repair the damage to the buildings and infrastructures, restore 
communication, and house the homeless Europeans. The government decided that 
it would be prudent to send a geologist to make a report of the earthquake. The 
Geological Survey of India (or GSI) had fewer than twenty members on its team 
to survey the entire subcontinent, but one of these was the geologist Richard 
Dixon Oldham (1858-1936) who had a special interest in earthquakes and who 
had a published on the topic. In fact, he was the only member of the GSI who had 
made special studies of earthquakes.5 The GSI was a product of several attempts 
                                                 
3 Geological Survey of India, Memoirs of the Geological Survey of India vol. 29 
(Calcutta: Office of the Geological Survey, 1889), 80. Afterwards, this memoir 
will be referred to simply as ‘Memoir.’  
4 Report on the Administration, i-xiv; Memoir, 4-41, 80; “Earthquake and 





5 Andrew Grout, "Oldham, Richard Dixon (1858–1936), geologist and 




by the East India Trading Company (EIC) to institute a systematic survey of the 
mineral resources of the Indian subcontinent. Often, these surveys were conducted 
by army surgeons travelling with the military. In 1851, they officially instituted 
the GSI, and over time, the responsibilities of its officers extended far beyond a 
simple mineralogical reconnaissance mission.6 Although their primary purpose 
was to locate valuable mineral deposits, they were also expected to make 
suggestions for where to build factories, lay rails, and cultivate plantations. The 
government relied on geologists to help map India for military purposes, educate 
new geologists and miners, and outline ways to make industries sustainable.7 
Assam was an especially critical area for geologists to survey, as the British 
discovered coal deposits, oil reserves, and a unique type of tea plant in 
northeastern India during the nineteenth century.8 When the British Raj took over 
from the EIC in 1858, their expectations of the colonial geologists and their 
purpose did not change much. Geologists expressed their frustration with their 
overwhelming duties and disappointed hopes with the Raj’s similar attitudes 
towards geology.9 After the 1897 earthquake, seismological studies and surveys 
became new requirements for geologists. They had previously commented on the 
earthquakes of India, but until R. D. Oldham’s memoir, none of them had 
                                                 
6 See, Andrew Grout, “Geology and India, 1770-1851. A Study in the Methods 
and Motivations of a Colonial Science” (doctoral dissertation, London University, 
1995).   
7 See, Aja Tolman, “Geologists and the British Raj, 1870-1910” (master’s thesis, 
Utah State University, 2016).  
8 See, Priyam Goswami, Assam in the Nineteenth Century: Industrialization and 
Colonial Penetration (Guwahati, Delhi: Spectrum Publications, 1999).  
9 Valentine Ball, A Manual of the Geology of India, Part III: Economic Geology 
(London: Trübner and Co., 1880), v.  
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published a full-length report on an earthquake. After the Assam Earthquake 
memoir, entire volumes dedicated to surveying earthquakes became a new 
standard for colonial geologists.10  
This thesis explores how Oldham created his report in colonial India and 
how his report in turn affected the evolving discipline of seismology. Collecting 
earthquake data from locations all over the world was a primary concern of 
seismologists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Yet seismology 
as practiced at the time was not yet a universal science. It only worked well in 
European landscapes, where buildings were made of brick and stone, where there 
were areas of dense population concentration, and where there was mutual trust 
and respect between seismologists and the public. Exporting seismology to the 
rest of the world challenged seismological practice on all of these points. 
Seismologists were forced to reassess their methodologies, epistemologies, and 
evidential criteria in the face of this “globalization” of their science. Oldham’s 
report and the subsequent methodologies he recommended embedded within them 
assumptions about the inferiority of Indians, especially their ability to be scientific 
observers, and the inferiority of their architecture. As one of the few 
seismological reports from a colonial “outpost,” seismologists in Europe used 
Oldham’s report in the already-existing debate over how to calibrate seismology 
so that it could be used across the world. Oldham’s report advocated for the 
instrumentalization of seismology, which would take the power of observing 
                                                 
10 For example, see, Geological Survey of India, Memoirs of the Geological 
Survey of India vol. 38 (Calcutta: Office of the Geological Survey, (1910).  
5 
earthquakes out of the hands of Indians and put it into the hands of a few 
instrument observers, rendering Indian knowledge and knowledge-makers 
invisible. He based his new methodology on social as much as physical 
considerations.   
Details about the earthquake appear in several types of sources, including 
photographs, government reports, newspaper and magazine articles, narratives, 
letters, and expense reports. These sources show not just the official and political 
aspects of the reports, but also the public responses to the disaster in both India 
and Britain. The photographs reveal how people visually documented an 
earthquake, and the newspapers reveal the confusion immediately following it. 
Although I will be using these sources, the primary source for this thesis is the 
official scientific report that Oldham submitted to the colonial government. A 
close reading of this text reveals subtle clues about how Oldham changed Mallet's 
methodology to fit the colonial situation, both out of physical necessity and social 
and political considerations. His text reveals how he collected information, 
including what types of questions he sent out and what he was looking for in 
observations. The letters in the report also reveal how Oldham wanted people to 
observe earthquakes. The evidence informants submitted varies widely, from 
reporting the weather the days before the earthquake to writing that at first, they 
thought the ground movement of the earthquake was caused by elephants bathing 
in a pool.11 It shows how the government tried to make sense of the disaster, and 
                                                 
11 Memoir, 9, 39.  
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what they expected a “scientific point of view alone” to look like.12 The report is a 
good example of how abstract theories translated to on-the-ground practices.  
Oldham intended the report to be accessible to scientists and the general 
public alike because, he said, of the general interest in the earthquake.13 And it is 
certainly true that this was a highly respected and influential report, becoming a 
well-known text, and making Oldham himself famous. The report is over 400 
pages long and includes a wide variety of evidence. Oldham includes descriptive 
letters, responses to his circulars, photographs, maps, sketches, mathematical 
formulas for analyzing pillar rotation, other geologists’ reports, his own 
observations, and detailed analysis of each observation. Charles Davison (1858-
1940), a seismologist and mathematician, mentions it several times in his works, 
saying that it was the work Oldham was best known for, and that as an earthquake 
survey, it was the “most careful and detailed that we possess.”14 It also “far 
surpassed in quality all reports on previous earthquakes.”15 Although he was 
actually a geologist, he was primarily known for his contributions to seismology, 
primarily because of his 1899 report and his 1900 theory of earthquake waves.    
                                                 
12 Memoir, 2.  
13 Memoir, v.  
14 Charles Davison, “Richard Dixon Oldham,” Obituary Notices of Fellows of the 
Royal Society 2, no. 5 (Dec.  
1936): 111. http://www.jstor.org/stable/769131; Davison, Great Earthquakes, 
139. 
15 "Oldham, Richard Dixon," in Complete Dictionary of Scientific Biography, 
203. Vol. 10. Detroit: Charles Scribner's Sons, 2008. Gale Virtual Reference 




As the recent work on earthquakes by historians shows, the meanings of 
earthquakes vary widely across time and space. They are not simply geological 
events. They are imbued with meaning, whether that meaning is social, economic, 
political, scientific, or religious, or a combination of all these elements. Defined 
as disasters, the meaning of earthquakes is deeply anthropocentric. They tend to 
exaggerate existing social and political tensions, providing a unique way to look 
at issues that were often simmering just beneath the surface.  
The historiography of earthquakes involves works that approach the 
subject from several analytical frameworks. Deborah Coen, in The Earthquake 
Observers, takes an intellectual and social history approach, exploring how 
observing and reporting earthquakes was a process of negotiation and translation 
between seismologists and the public. Conevery Bolton Valenčius and Charles 
Walker, in The Lost History of the New Madrid Earthquakes and Shaky 
Colonialism, use cultural and political history frameworks, showing how the 
populations affected by the earthquakes made sense of and interpreted the 
disasters in the midwestern United States and Peru. Gregory Clancey tackles the 
history of earthquakes in late nineteenth and early twentieth-century Japan using 
architectural history as his lens in Earthquake Nation. By focusing on the 
anthropocentric nature of disasters, the histories center the human experiences of 
earthquakes. Similarly, all show that public engagement characterized the history 
of early seismology. The public constructed the meaning of earthquakes but also 
came up with their own methods of observation and verifications. Professional 
researchers attempted to tap into, direct, and control these networks of 
8 
information. Their success largely depended on the trust and communication they 
established. The books that deal with later seismology show how these public 
observations and the two-way communication subsequently broke down, both for 
external sociotechnical reasons and the internal mechanization of the field. 
Science in the colonial state, as a secondary theme in a few of the books, 
addresses how colonial ‘outposts’ helped structure seismology.  
All share the anthropocentric focus of earthquakes-as-disasters. Each book 
shows how survivors and observers constructed how to ‘properly’ observe and 
interpret an earthquake. Coen reminds her readers that the “unabashedly 
anthropocentric” nature of nineteenth century seismology studied earthquakes’ 
impact on humans and had “human interests at heart.”16 Because of this focus, she 
explores how people observed earthquakes throughout Europe, the western United 
States, and Samoa, contrasting the differences as relationships between the public 
and the seismologists shifted. In one example, Coen shows how Swiss 
seismologists particularly valued women’s observations because women were 
supposed to be far more sensitive than men.17 Walker shows how as the 
eighteenth century Lima administration and public were trying to understand who 
to blame for the earthquake, they created legislation that limited the mobility and 
visibility of women and the indigenous population. Their efforts were primarily 
preventative, to stop God from sending another earthquake and tsunami, so 
pinpointing the exact cause of the earthquake and whom it affected most was 
                                                 
16 Deborah Coen, The Earthquake Observers: Disaster Science from Lisbon to 
Richter (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013), 11.  
17 Coen, Earthquake Observers, 86. 
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essential. Valenčius examines how the public constructed a narrative of the 1811-
1812 New Madrid earthquakes in the absence of a governing scientific authority. 
They decided their own criteria for observing the earthquakes and aftershocks and 
verified their results through correspondence and newspapers. The earthquakes, 
Valenčius also claims, helped start the Great Revival as well as prompted some 
Native American revolts against the western-moving whites. Clancey shows how 
the Japanese used the several earthquakes of Japan and their newly developed 
methods of observation to fashion themselves as an ‘earthquake nation’ at the 
forefront of research. In each of these books, earthquakes were not simply events. 
They had religious, moral, and political meaning in addition to the supposed 
scientific meaning.  
Because of this multifaceted construction of meaning, the authors focus on 
the public participation in observing and constructing meaning. Scientists, as 
Coen explains, did not know how to gather observations from the public any 
better than the public knew how to observe earthquakes ‘scientifically.’ Through 
multiple trial and error efforts, the Swiss and Austrian scientists established public 
education, and in return, they used their conclusions to benefit the populations 
that submitted observations. Though these European countries established good 
methods of communication between public and professional, other places in the 
world, like Samoa and Great Britain, were less successful. British earthquakes 
became something of a joke and in Samoa, Samoan participation did not matter 
much at all. Earthquake observation techniques varied widely across place, and 
much of it was dependent on the degrees of trust between scientists and the 
10 
public. However, Coen points out, seismology was absolutely bound by the 
experience of people and in willingness to observe. Valenčius’ book is, primarily, 
the story of an American public science operated almost independently of any 
scientific authority. The earthquakes reveal “what science really was in the early 
United States: a set of questions and debates in which many people, from a wide 
range of geographic and social places, regarded themselves as engaged 
participants.”18 The earthquakes, at the time, were one of the greatest unifiers of 
the public who engaged in constructing how to observe earthquakes.  
Valenčius’ story is also one of how these earthquakes were subsequently 
forgotten. The process of silencing public observations is another theme that 
many of the authors address. Coen and Clancey both examine how scientists tried 
to use mechanization to make the public voice unnecessary. Clancey shows how 
turning to instruments in Japan was the way that seismologists tried to make their 
science commensurable and competitive with European seismology, while Coen 
explores how the instrumental turn was an effort to unmake earthquakes as 
disasters, which led to a breakdown of two-way communication between 
scientists and the public. Valenčius, however, looks at the specific processes that 
led America to forget the earthquakes. She identifies sociopolitical problems, such 
as the Civil War and selling the Midwest as a site of grain production, as a few of 
the specific reasons the earthquakes and their observers were made invisible in 
history. Valenčius also identifies the simple problem that “they do not in any way 
                                                 
18 Conevery Bolton Valenčius, The Lost History of the New Madrid Earthquakes 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 11.  
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resemble our usual histories of science” and so were not included in the history of 
science narrative.19 As her title implies, this history was lost. 
Although usually a secondary argument, most books deal with colonialism 
as a factor in the history of seismology. Clancey and Walker tackle this directly. 
Walker examines how colonial anxieties revealed by the earthquake shaped 
subsequent policies of racial segregation and city building. Clancey shows that in 
the Japanese case, the clash of East and West led to the collaborative creation of a 
new type of seismology, seismographs, and aseismic structures. For Clancey, 
conducting seismology outside of the West was fundamental in the development 
of modern seismology. It was an important part of ‘calibration,’ a term Kapil Raj 
uses to describe the process of making fieldwork-based scientific disciplines 
globally applicable.20 Colonialism is less conspicuous in Coen’s and Valenčius’ 
books, though Valenčius notes that the indigenous populations saw the 
earthquakes as a sign of displeasure that the Europeans had settled on Native 
American land, which led to conflict. Coen also addressed the role of colonialism, 
using the Samoan outpost as an example of the Europeans’ dedication to 
gathering data worldwide. The colonial question and locations, Coen believes, 
shaped the direction of seismology. Each show that encountering other cultures 
and locations while gathering data and assigning meaning profoundly affected the 
formation seismology throughout the history of earthquake observation.  
                                                 
19 Valenčius , Lost History, 11. 
20 Kapil Raj, Relocating Modern Science: Circulation and the Construction of 
Knowledge in South Asia and Europe, 1650-1900 (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007.) 
12 
Looking at the history of seismology in Colonial India reveals many of the 
same themes. European seismologists in India had to determine what type of 
relationship they needed to establish with the Indians. Unlike most of the other 
books, seismologists actively downplayed the amount of public participation 
contained in their surveys. This thesis explores some possible motivations for this 
relationship between seismologists and the public. It looks at how the scientists 
structured public participation and which people were allowed to participate in 
creating the 1897 earthquake narrative. In addition, it examines what a ‘scientific’ 
earthquake report was supposed to look like, and this mostly meant that the 
human element was eliminated or hidden. The process of silencing the public is a 
major theme, as colonial scientists in India attempted to undermine, control, and 
categorize the Indian observations and reactions. Oldham’s argument for the 
instrumental turn in seismology was based primarily on the supposed unsuitability 
of colonial subjects as scientific observers. This story particularly challenges 
Clancey’s narrative by providing an alternate example of how the construction of 
seismology unfolded differently under a different power hierarchy, funding 
model, and government response. Instead of taking a collaborative approach like 
the scientists did in Japan, India is an example of an explicit rejection of 
collaboration in favor of making seismology more eurocentric and exclusive to 
trained seismologists.  
Part of the problem of the historiography is the dependence on the 
outdated histories of seismology written by Charles Davison in the early decades 
of the twentieth century. By adopting these narratives uncritically in their books, a 
13 
few of the authors also adopt Davison’s triumphal tone of technological 
determinism, explaining that once seismographs were good enough to replace 
human observers, seismologists adopted them unquestioningly.21 This thesis 
challenges this narrative by taking a history of science and technology approach 
and recentering the history of seismology and seismographs. By looking at the 
contested transition to the ‘new’ seismology, it takes into account the role that 
colonial scientists played in pushing for the transition. 
The first chapter explores how Oldham conducted his survey in Assam. 
Since his methods worked only if there were European structures and 
infrastructures, most of his report is an assessment of how the earthquake 
damaged the British empire in India. His report focused on imperial architecture, 
railways, telegraphs, and time. The tool he relied on most was the imperial 
communication network. However, his report would have been sadly incomplete 
if he had only relied on the evidence from the damaged empire. He also relied on 
Indian observations and observational techniques, which he incorporated into his 
report. However, keeping the international and colonial audience in mind, 
Oldham tried to disguise the origins of these Indian-specific methods, and 
developed a fixation on verifying any Indian evidence with his own observations. 
The Indians’ structures mostly escaped damage from the earthquake, and the 
Indians were able to quickly recover from the earthquake’s devastation. However, 
                                                 
21 Coen is the author that discusses the transition from observational seismology 
to the ‘new’ instrumental seismology. However, she takes an approach that 
emphasizes that the point of contest was a question of social responsibility rather 
than analyzing the history of the instruments themselves.  
14 
this flexibility meant that the greatest strength of their structures, their ability to 
withstand earthquakes, was something that Oldham did not know how to read as 
scientific data. His modified methodology was based on both physical and social 
considerations, including adjustments to intensity scales and evidence. This 
resulted in an invisibility of Indian bodies and observations. Making seismology a 
universal science, Oldham argued, required seismologists to transcend, rather than 
embrace, the particularities of each location. Instead of being a transcendent 
science, however, his methods further insulated European seismology from the 
rest of the world, privileging European data, instruments, and epistemologies.  
 The second chapter looks at how this report functioned as an argument in 
larger seismological debates and influenced the direction of the field. 
Seismographs were unreliable instruments, as seismologists were still 
constructing the definition of what a good seismograph measured and what an 
accurate seismogram looked like. Still, Oldham argued that because of the 
difficulties of colonial seismology, instruments were naturally a better alternative 
as they lessened seismologists’ dependence on the public and separated them 
from the varying demands of regional fieldwork. Being one of the few reports 
from colonies, Oldham’s work was an important perspective that seismologists 
considered when deciding how to make seismology a universal science and 
whether seismology should position itself as a subdiscipline of geophysics. His 
later work confirmed his suggestions, as he used inscriptions from seismographs 
to provide the first instrumental proof that the earth had a core and that there were 
three distinct types of earthquake waves. Compared to Japan, this section shows 
15 
that Oldham’s way of universalizing seismology was not the only way, as the 
Japanese took a different approach to making seismology fit their country’s needs.  
  
16 
Chapter 2: Observational Seismology in Colonial India 
 In 1897, seismology was a relatively new discipline, being only about 
forty years old.22 At this point, most seismologists used the method called 
observational seismology, which meant that they used observations of the 
secondary effects of earthquakes, such as damage to buildings, to draw inferences 
about the origin, intensity, and direction of the shock. Robert Mallet (1810-1881) 
laid the foundations for this method in his famous 1862 book Great Neapolitan 
earthquake of 1857: The First Principles of Observational Seismology. 
Seismologists (a term Mallet also invented) across Europe and Japan used his 
method to document their own earthquakes. Observational seismology was far 
from universal, however. Developed in Europe, it was deeply tied to the 
landscapes of its origins. It relied on the assumptions that surveys were being 
conducted in Europe, where many homes were built of brick or stone, where there 
were areas of dense population, and where there was mutual respect and trust 
between seismologists and the public. R. D. Oldham found that this method was a 
remarkably inadequate fit for India. With the variations in architecture, language, 
and power hierarchies, India seemed to rebuff attempts to capture her earthquakes 
in scientific surveys. Only British colonial structures and infrastructures yielded 
information that fit within Mallet’s guidelines.  
                                                 
22 Robert Mallet, Great Neapolitan Earthquake of 1857. The First Principles of 
Observational Seismology as Developed in the Report to the Royal Society of 
London of the Expedition Made by Command of the Society into the Interior of the 
Kingdom of Napes, to Investigate the Circumstances of the Great Earthquake of 
December 1857, volumes 1&2 (London: Chapman and Hall, 1862.) 
https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015064473799. 
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 Oldham’s primary concern was to make a seismology that worked in 
colonial landscapes. Faced with problems that the field had not yet addressed, 
Oldham modified seismology according to social, political, and physical 
considerations. Instead of trying to create a hybrid science, one that drew on the 
strengths of European seismology combined with local indigenous knowledge for 
a new method specially produced to make use of the unique circumstances, 
Oldham stripped observational methodology down to its most basic form, 
eliminating the primary place of human reactions and public observations in 
scales and maps. In other words, he tried to eliminate everything that was ‘Indian’ 
about the Indian earthquake, framing his survey as something that was conducted 
despite the location. This colonial seismology made it more difficult to compare 
the Assam earthquake to other earthquakes around the world, was less specific 
and informative than most other earthquake surveys, and rendered the Indian 
voice invisible.  
 Oldham would not have been able to conduct one of the most important 
and influential seismological surveys of the nineteenth century if not for the 
colonial architecture, infrastructures, and practices that had come with the 
colonization of India, structures which his methodology told him how to read. The 
railways, telegraphs, steamships, architecture, and tea plantations all gave Oldham 
ways to ‘see’ the earthquake. Both the destruction and functioning of these 
technologies and systems gave Oldham most of the tools he needed to conduct the 
survey. However, they also made the earthquake more costly, disruptive, and 
deadly. Railways, telegraphs, and damaged buildings required extensive and 
18 
expensive repairs. Stone buildings collapsed on their inhabitants, crushing them. 
And the deforestation and increase in population due to tea plantations made it 
possible for hundreds of people to die in the lowlands near the Brahmaputra 
River.  
The structures of the Indians, on the other hand, were developed to survive 
earthquakes. Although more than 1,540 Indians died (as opposed to only 2 
Europeans), the Indian population as a whole was able to recover from the 
earthquake much more quickly than the Europeans. The amount of destruction 
caused by the earthquake seemed directly proportional to the adoption of 
European structures; the earthquake was far more devastating for Indians who had 
incorporated European elements, such as chimneys. As a consequence, the 
earthquake affected the wealthier population of India more acutely than the poor 
as the wealthier population had been more able and, in many cases, more willing 
to adopt the European architecture and lifestyle. It drew a clear line between the 
colonizer and the colonized and exposed the fragility of the empire to natural 
disaster.  
Although the embodiment of colonialism in technologies, masonry 
buildings, and transportation and communication systems were Oldham’s most 
important tool, it would be a mistake to overlook the essential contributions by the 
Indians. Despite his efforts to maintain a strict distance from Indian information, 
the size of the subcontinent, the peculiarities of the specific regions, and the 
transient but landscape-altering nature of the earthquake shock necessitated his 
dependence on information and observational techniques gathered from Indians. 
19 
For him, this dependence on human testimony was one of the biggest flaws of his 
report. He tried to remedy this by burying their contributions under his own 
observations and quietly incorporating their techniques for tracking earth 
movement.  
Oldham could not escape the differences between conducting an 
observational seismological survey in Europe and conducting one in India. 
Mallet’s seismological methods required extensive modification for use in India. 
Oldham relied both on Indians’ testimonies and observational techniques to 
complete his survey. Their methods were subsumed into Oldham’s methodology, 
but the origins of these methods were deliberately obscured by Oldham in an 
effort to appear more objective in his reports. Collecting evidence from colonized 
people and writing a report about a colony meant that Oldham had different 
priorities than a seismologist observing and writing about Europe. Oldham 
decided to reinforce the hierarchical power structure in his presentation of the 
report. Indian voices and evidence fade into the background or are 
remanufactured into fearful, unscientific commotion, while the triumph of the 
European over difficulties shines. Cognizant of his target audience, other 
European seismologists and the general public, Oldham made it a priority to 
verify each Indian report he included (European evidence was not subjected to the 
same rigorous standard) and downplay the major role the Indian observers had in 
creating this report.  
20 
Mallet, Observational Seismology, and India 
 In 1857, Robert Mallet (1810-1881) penned a letter to the Royal Society, 
requesting funds to travel to Italy to study the large earthquake that had just 
devastated the southern part of the peninsula.23 In the letter, he described his 
method for studying the earthquake based on observing the secondary effects. He 
laid out the method in his famous book, Great Neapolitan Earthquake of 1857: 
The First Principles of Observational Seismology.  
Other [phenomena and effects] are more or less permanent, and, from the 
terrible handwriting of overturned towns and buildings, may be 
deciphered, more or less clearly, the conditions under which the forces 
that overthrew them acted, and velocity with which the ground beneath 
was moved, the extent of its oscillations, and ultimately the point, can be 
found in position and depth beneath the earth’s surface, from which the 
original blow was delivered, which, propagated through the elastic 
materials of the mass above and around, constituted the shock. Again, 
certain effects, such as landslips, fissures, alterations of water-courses, 
&c., are produced of greater or less permanency affecting the natural 
features of the shaken country.24 
 
By observing these semi-permanent effects, a trained seismologist could produce 
a scientific map and report about an earthquake soon after it had happened. A 
well-conducted survey was meticulously detailed and thorough. For example, 
observers should note, and sketch or photograph, if possible, the cracks and 
damage to walls and record the direction structures fell. They should also record 
building material, general condition, number of openings (for doors and 
windows), dimensions, foundation materials, and any other relevant information 
about affected buildings. An observer should weigh and measure projected 
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bodies, chemically analyze gases and material that erupt out of fissures, time and 
measure seas and sound waves, record the reactions of animals, and explain local 
geological conditions. They also needed to document landslides fissures, changes 
to river-courses, tide levels, dead animals (especially fish), and meteorological 
information like rainfall and temperature.25 Almost every detail was relevant to an 
earthquake report.  
 Seismology also relied on information gathered from those who had 
experienced the earthquake. These public observers wrote to seismologists, telling 
them of their own personal impressions of the earthquake, such as the time they 
first felt it, how long it lasted, what direction the waves seemed to be moving in, 
the general type of movement (waves or jolt, for instance), and any proof they 
could come up with to corroborate their claims. These collections of observations 
were goldmines for seismologists, who depended on them to complete their 
analyses.  
Mallet also included information instructing people in how to make what 
he called seismometers, or instruments that measure earthquakes. Making 
seismology an instrumental science was a goal from the very beginnings of the 
discipline. The data gathered from various types of seismometers was also 
included in earthquake reports, but they did not have a privileged place. Rather, 
they were usually included towards the end to provide extra evidence for an 
observer’s conclusions.  
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As he had hoped, Mallet's methodology became the default method for 
seismologists around the world, although each put their own twist on it according 
to the constraints of the areas in which they worked. 26 His invention of isoseismal 
maps became an important part of reports. Intensity scales also began to appear. 
The purpose of the maps and scales was to be able to compare earthquakes. 
Mapping and documenting earthquakes across the world and across time became 
the primary objective of seismologists. Their goal was to understand the global 
mechanics of the interior of the earth.  
 Observational seismology made its way to India through Thomas Oldham 
(1816-1878), the director of the GSI and father of R. D. Oldham. The GSI 
struggled the first two years of its existence, as its directors kept dying or retiring. 
It was not until Thomas Oldham took over the survey in 1852 that it began to get 
organized. Eventually, it was labelled a "premier scientific institution."27 Its 
primary purpose originally was to map and report on the economic, military, and 
political value of the subcontinent. While working on this map of India, he turned 
his attention and efforts to seismology. This interest and study started in 1869.  
 While sitting in a house near Calcutta, quietly reading to himself, Thomas 
Oldham felt the ground underneath him lurch.  
[W]ithout any warning, the chair was violently rocked under me, 
everything in the room was shaken, doors and windows rattled and the 
chandeliers hanging from the ceiling were set swinging with considerable 
force. At once noting the time of the shock by my own watch, and just 
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then feeling a second but less violent shock pass under me, I got up to see 
more particularly what had occurred.28 
 
He watched as furnishings swayed and listened to the shouts of people in the 
bazaar. The 1869 Cachar Earthquake, which occurred about 300 miles away from 
where Thomas Oldham was staying, sparked his interest in seismology. After 
carefully reading Mallet's report, Oldham undertook a small survey of the 
earthquake. He also catalogued all of the historical Indian earthquakes of which 
he could find record. Before his works were printed, he retired to Britain and died 
soon after in 1878. It was his son, R. D. Oldham, who edited his father's records 
of the earthquakes and published them in an edition of the Memoirs of the 
Geological Survey of India.  
 R. D. Oldham also developed an interest in seismology and continued his 
father's work on earthquakes. Like his father, he used Mallet's observational 
seismology, although he included all the most recent theories and methods in his 
report as well, as seismology was a rapidly growing field. When the 1897 Assam 
earthquake struck, his knowledge was stretched to the limit. He was the geologist 
who was assigned to survey the ruins left by the earthquake and publish a report. 
Oldham took two years to complete the report, as the survey required not only 
gathering observations, but also computing mathematical calculations. Several of 
his many publications (over ninety) dealt with seismology theory and fieldwork.29 
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Observational Seismology in India: Architecture 
According to Mallet’s book, damage to architecture was one of the most 
valuable indices of an earthquake’s strength and direction. By assessing the 
damage to each building, a seismologist could guess how near to the epicenter the 
building was, along with the direction and possibly even type of wave, that passed 
under the damage building. By observing groups of damaged buildings, a 
seismologist would then be able to make a map of how the damage of an 
earthquake changed as it moved through the ground. This map, called an 
isoseismal map, was a key document that seismologists were supposed to produce 
in an earthquake report. The type of damage, and buildings’ susceptibility to it, 
was key in presenting this method of survey. European architecture was rare in 
northeastern India. Oldham could not observe architectural damage in the same 
way he would have been able to in Europe, and architecture overall was not very 
helpful in building the report, besides the drawing of the isoseismal map. There 
were a few European-style houses scattered across Assam and Bangladesh, but 
the majority of the buildings were built in the Indian style. The Indians’ houses, 
and specifically the houses of the Garos and Khasi, withstood the earthquake 
much better than any of the masonry constructions, most of which were owned by 
Europeans. 
 The typical Indian house in Assam in 1897 was labelled the ekra, or ikra, 
house, named after the reed that grew locally. These houses had lightweight 
bamboo frames and were covered in ikra mats. The ikra was then coated in 
plaster. The house rested directly on a stone or earth foundation; their frames were 
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not sunk into the ground for stability. Some of these houses had masonry 
chimneys. These usually did not survive the earthquake.30 When the shock hit the 
house, the chimney collapsed onto the delicate frame, smashing it. In most cases, 
however, the Indians lived in small, chimney-free houses. Although all houses 
very near the epicenter of the earthquake collapsed, most Indian houses survived 
the earthquake with minimum damage. The most common complaint was that all 
the plaster got shaken into pink dust which clouded the air around the villages.31 
The Garo houses were even more capable of tolerating the earthquake. These 
houses did not have plaster coatings, had “a raised floor and [were] built entirely 
of wood, bamboo, cane, and thatch. These houses, when on level ground and in 
fairly good repair,” Captain A. A. Howell reported, “have not been at all affected 
by the shaking.”32  
 Most Indian houses were not destroyed by the shock of the earthquake 
itself. Landslides were the greatest threat to these homes. Many of the houses 
were built on hillsides or up against a cliff, so when the earthquake shook the 
earth underneath them loose, they were carried off of the hillside or were crushed 
underneath the debris that fell off of the cliff. This is how most of the earthquake 
victims died. In other parts of Assam, the houses in the lowlands were carried into 
the river when the riverbank subsided. For others, the ground liquified underneath 
them during the earthquake, which caused them to sink up to their roofs in the 
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liquid earth.33 If they escaped landslides and liquefaction, the Indian houses 
tolerated the earthquake well, except for the loss of the plaster coating. They had 
not, however, been affected by the earthquake in any way that Oldham could use 
for his report. The house had either stood or crumbled into a heap, providing no 
indication of the direction, intensity, or type of waves. They were also quick and 
easy to assemble, relative to stone or brick buildings, so many of the collapsed 
houses had been repaired or replaced by the time Oldham or another GSI 
geologist had a chance to survey the damage. Damage to the average Indian 
house, then, could not be used as a seismological index. The very durability, 
flexibility, and simplicity of construction which made it ideal for a seismic 
country also made it unsuitable for Western seismology. Observational 
seismology depended on the western assumption that structures were aseismic and 
would sustain more or less permanent damage from an earthquake. Oldham and 
other seismologists relied on masonry buildings to ‘see’ an earthquake. The 
Indian home could not capture a snapshot of an earthquake the same way that 
masonry homes could.  
Although Indian-style buildings were not an important feature in 
earthquake reports, their resiliency and easy construction caught the government’s 
attention. After the earthquake, the government decided to change the way it built 
structures in Assam. The Assam officials noted that they reconstructed houses and 
government buildings, such as jails, in the ekra style, both to save on cost and to 
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prevent further future damage by earthquakes and aftershocks.34 The British 
began adopting the Indian style of construction to prevent such large-scale 
destruction and loss of life in the future. There was never any acknowledgment 
that the Indians knew better ways to live in a seismic area than the British did. 
None of it was attributed to Indian ingenuity or experience. Most of the time, 
officials justified their change in building tactics by citing cost savings. Instead of 
simply building inexpensive Western-style wooden houses, however, they styled 
their new structures after the Indian houses. But these houses, instead of being 
thought of as especially aseismic structures, were thought of as inferior to English 
style. They were rarely referred to as houses, most often being termed ‘huts.’35 
In the Indian memory, by contrast, the Indian-style houses and the British 
adoption of this construction style continues to be a source of national pride. Jai 
Krishna, an engineer, wrote that Indians had developed their building style 
because of centuries of observations.36 Sanjoy Hazarika, in a 2015 newspaper 
article, attributed the increasing number of concrete buildings to man’s arrogance, 
advocating for a return to the Assam-type house.37 Even though the British never 
verbally praised the Indian methods of building, their allocation of funds and 
changes in building policy revealed the reluctant acknowledgment of aseismic 
Indian buildings.  
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 The few European masonry homes and buildings, unlike the majority of 
Indian homes, were severely damaged, if not completely destroyed, by the 
earthquake. In Assam, all masonry and brick buildings were total losses. They 
crumbled into stone mounds, burying any of their inhabitants who had not 
managed to escape in time. In Calcutta, European houses were constructed in a 
particular European style that was especially weak against earthquake movement. 
Their weight and proportion were not evenly distributed across the house itself, 
resulting in points of weakness. They split down the middle, repeatedly separating 
and crashing back together as each wave hit them.38 Although the Calcutta houses 
did not have much irreparable damage, the repeated smashing together of the 
split-open houses was a terrifying spectacle. Only two Europeans died during the 
earthquake: Mr. R. B. McCabe, the Inspector General of Police and Jails, and Mr. 
Rossenrode, “a pensioner of the Survey Department.”39 Both died after their 
homes collapsed and crushed them.40 The Assam police department spent the first 
hour after the earthquake digging out McCabe’s body from the rubble as his wife 
looked on.41 Many Europeans who lived in stone or brick homes were left 
homeless after the quake. The weather had been remarkably hot, and there were 
heavy rainstorms in Assam when the earthquake took place, although they had not 
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yet reached monsoon season.42 Aftershocks continued to shake Assam daily for 
over two years following the disaster, and immediately following the earthquake 
there was an aftershock about every ten minutes.43 Unsurprisingly, the people 
living in Assam avoided the ruined masonry houses and opted to take shelter in 
Indian ekra or Garo outbuildings, such as stables. Still others preferred to sleep on 
the cricket field in the rain because they were afraid to return to a structure that 
might collapse on them in their sleep, even if it was an ekra building.44 The 
lightness of the Garo houses made them fairly safe; even if they did collapse they 
likely would not kill their occupants. 
The earthquake drew a rather distinct line between the relatively resilient 
Indian houses and the rigid European houses. As the Assam Administration noted, 
[i]t soon became apparent that the catastrophe was one which had 
principally affected the wealthy and well-to-do classes of the community, 
who reside in masonry buildings. The poor, who live in mat huts, did not 
suffer very much…But from whatever point of view it may be regarded, 
the losses sustained by the people of Assam in consequence of the 
earthquake must be considered immense, and among the wealthy and 
comparatively well-to-do the loss and suffering were acute.45  
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A wealthy Bangladeshi also noticed the divide between the wealthy and poor. 
“The upper classes I may say have suffered the most, and the lower classes the 
least.”46 Because the British, Indian, and Bangladeshi upper classes lived in 
masonry buildings, the earthquake showed a rather stark difference between 
colonizers and colonized, wealthy and poor.  
 The poor Indians noticed this too. Captain A. A. Howell, who wrote a 
letter about the earthquake, was concerned that the alleged rumor that Queen 
Victoria ordered the earthquake would prompt Garos “without a doubt” to cause 
trouble.47 He attributes the lack of trouble to the European officials’ wrecked 
houses in Tura. Howell implied that after observing the demolition of the imperial 
buildings, the Garos concluded that the Queen would not have ruined her own 
peoples’ buildings.48  
 Although both the Indians and the British generally divided the houses 
into masonry (damaged or destroyed, Western) and Indian (undamaged, Oriental), 
the distinction between the levels of damage and the types of houses was not as 
sharp as they imagined it to be.  Several Indian houses collapsed, and several 
strongly built masonry buildings a good distance from the epicenter remained 
standing even if the houses near them collapsed. Many mosques and Hindu 
temples were built of stone, and several collapsed with the earthquake. Oldham, 
however, could not read the Indian architectural damage. He did not have the 
framework or architectural knowledge to turn this into data. However, the 
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majority of the masonry or brick buildings in 1897 were British. “In India, kiln-
break structures laid in lime mortar were limited to churches, government, and 
railway buildings and in rural center chiefly to factories and tea estates.”49  
Although it lay outside the British empire, Tibet also had several stone 
buildings, especially Buddhist monasteries, which were affected by the 
earthquake.50 Because Oldham could not easily travel to and survey Tibet or the 
Himalayas, he could only make a guess about the damage caused there. However, 
because the buildings were made of stone, he would have been able to ascertain 
the direction and intensity of the earthquake in Tibet after it had passed under the 
Himalayas. In this case, politics were as much a boundary to observational 
seismology as any physical barrier. He did not, however, pay much attention to 
the Hindu or Muslim buildings that were made of stone that he had access to, so it 
is doubtful that he would have made better use of the Tibetan temples. One 
possible reason for this omission is that he was familiar with the architectural 
design of Western buildings, including their strengths and weaknesses. Using 
Indian stone buildings in his report would have required him to become familiar 
with Indian architecture. However, Oldham did not use the damage to these 
temples as his primary data, contrary to observational seismology’s methods. He 
noted them, but often only whether they were damaged. Some of the other 
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geologists, like Thomas Henry Digges La Touche (1856-1938; the only geologist 
near Assam during the earthquake) carefully documented these temples and the 
damage they observed. Oldham included these observations in an appendix but 
did not comment on them further.51 
His methodology constrained him to observing masonry buildings, so he 
needed to make some adjustments to the seismology. He modified the scale to 
better fit the conditions of India.  
In a closely populated and civilised country, where most of the buildings 
are of brick or stone, this was possible, but the area over which this 
earthquake was felt is a largely wild, thinly populated country, and even in 
the thickly populated parts brick and stone buildings are rare and widely 
scattered. As a result it has been found impossible to attempt to define 
more than seven degrees of intensity...52  
 
The modifications enabled Oldham to draw the isoseismic map. His modified 
scale eliminated most of the human elements of Rossi-Forel Scale; the most he 
included was that the earthquake was “universally felt,” “generally noticed,” and 
“noticed by a small proportion of people.”53 By removing the human element, and 
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many of the other descriptions that would be appropriate for most European 
villages, his scale was not necessarily adapted for India as much as pared down to 
be suitable to almost any settings. He attributes the necessary modifications to the 
Rossi-Forel Scale to the lack of and distance between masonry buildings.54 
Since it was necessary to make his report comparable with other surveys, 
Oldham restricted himself to analyzing and mapping Western-style masonry 
buildings. Calibrating observational seismology to the Indian landscape, for him, 
meant eliminating the unique characteristics of India. He did not add to the scale, 
only subtracted from it. The scale as a tool of the seismologist, then, was still 
essentially eurocentric. It could reflect xonly the damage to the colony instead of 
measuring intensity across the subcontinent, including new methods of 
observation. Calibrating the seismological intensity scale outside of Europe 
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stripped it of most of its descriptors and four of its levels, leaving it a less 
effective tool for making a useful worldwide map of earthquakes.  
Observational Seismology in India: Infrastructures 
Since architecture proved to be so problematic, Oldham relied on other 
colonial infrastructures to help him construct his report. The technological 
networks of the British Raj were the most useful tools to which he had access. 
The damaged railways, and more importantly the telegraph, helped him assess the 
lateral movement of the ground and document the supposed electricity generated 
by the earthquake’s aftershocks.55 However, the networks were more helpful to 
him once they had been repaired. Their distribution and the ease of 
communication between them gave Oldham access to the personal observations of 
hundreds of colonial officials. 
 The earthquake devastated the imperial infrastructures of communication 
and transportation in northeast India. The railways and roads were broken and 
impassable, and the telegraph was useless. The force of the earthquake bent, 
twisted, snapped, and sunk the railway tracks. It downed bridges, collapsed the 
stations, and, in some cases, swallowed up whole train cars.56 Telegraph lines 
snapped, and roads were fissured, flooded, and broken up. All were unusable, so 
news initially travelled slowly between Assam and Calcutta. Steamboats, the only 
transportation system still working, carried the post to and from Assam.  
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 While some of the rail lines were mostly unharmed, others were complete 
losses. The Therīaghāt line, for example, was permanently closed because it was 
so badly damaged.57 The government devoted their resources to getting the trains 
running again. Most repairs to the tracks were carried out within a month.58 
Although troublesome for the government, the damaged railways were a godsend 
for Oldham. He used them to study the changes in the landscape and make precise 
measurements about the permanent lateral movement of the ground. If the land 
had moved, the tracks made it clear by how much they had shifted. G. E. Grimes, 
one of the geologists working on the survey explained how he used the mangled 
tracks to determine the movement: 
Between Daragon and Shaistaganj the embankment, which is quite low, 
was much broken down and the line twisted into curves for a considerable 
distance, and as I was going over it on a trolley, Mr. F. P. Anderson, the 
Executive Engineer, Shaistaganj Section, Assam-Bengal Railway, pointed 
out to me that the line was shifted several feet from its original positions. 
As the alignment here was perfectly straight for a considerable distance 
and part of it had not suffered the slightest, this could be tested with 
certainty, and at my request Mr. R. K. Coxe, Assistant Engineer, 
Shaistaganj Section, set up his theodolite and took sights along the line.59 
 
Because of its rigidity, the railway had made a permanent and readable record of 
the seismic movement.  
 The damage to the telegraph offices was also helpful, but in a different 
way. They did not track the ground movements, but Oldham recorded examples 
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of the “Electric Effects” of the earthquake. He believed that the accounts from this 
earthquake were the most conspicuous of all evidence suggesting that earthquakes 
changed the electrical state of the “atmosphere and earth currents.”60 Besides 
several reports of interrupted communication of telegraph lines, J. G. Morgan, the 
Assistant Superintendent of Telegraphs in the Shillong subdivision, wrote that 
while they were digging out the instruments and indicators from the rubble and 
trying to restore power to the telegraph lines, he, the signalers, and the telegraph 
master were electrocuted several times, each electrical shock quickly followed by 
an earthquake aftershock. He also carefully noted that there was no lighting or 
thunder at the time.61 Another telegraph master noted that the aftershocks would 
shut down and then restore the battery currents. He added that several of his 
officers had been shocked and wires had sparked throughout the region, 
immediately followed by aftershocks.62 Oldham did not comment extensively on 
the implications of these anecdotes but believed that the intensity of the electric 
shocks meant that the earthquake needed to be explained in more than mechanical 
terms, and that future seismologists or geologists should explore what electric 
currents could reveal about the origin of an earthquake.63  
 The time kept by the stations masters at both railways stations and 
telegraph offices was the most important observation produced by these 
infrastructures. “Of all the data required in seismological investigations,” Oldham 
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wrote, “none are so important and none so difficult to obtain as the exact times at 
which the various phases of an earthquake were felt.”64 By comparing times, 
Oldham would be able to measure the rate the waves traveled, which would help 
him pinpoint the epicenter and differentiate between different types of waves. He 
would also be able to analyze how each type of wave traveled through rocks and 
soils of different types and densities. Mallet, in his chapter in the Manual of 
Scientific Enquiry, included descriptions of how to modify clocks with pendulums 
to track earthquake time. With some simple alterations to the body of the clock, 
one could construct a simple instrument that would stop the clock the moment the 
shock first hit the area.65 Although the instructions were specifically targeted to 
members of the British navy, the instructions (and illustrations) were simple 
enough that anyone could construct this type of seismometer.  
 On the surface, it seems like the distribution of railway and telegraph 
offices would be sufficient to make an accurate map of time. Every telegraph 
office in India and Burma (Myanmar) were required to submit the time they first 
noticed the earthquake to Oldham. However, he discovered that collecting and 
making sense of the various time reports was difficult.66 Most of the difficulties 
and errors he attributed to the human error and differences between individuals. 
Two people standing side by side, he suggests, could give two different time 
reports because one might be able to feel it (or at least recognize it) sooner than 
the other. Besides that, he discovered that little-used, remote telegraph and 
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railway stations did not make much effort to keep time meticulously, and in 
observational seismology, every second matters. The more important stations, 
such as those in Calcutta, were able to send in accurate times, but many of the 
Assam stations’ numbers disagreed with each other. This, Oldham said, was 
because “[i]t is not in human nature to take more trouble than is necessary to 
attain the purpose desired.”67 This human element was what he hoped to eliminate 
with a network of instruments. If he could get accurate time readings and wave 
descriptions from only a few key places, then he would be able to construct an 
accurate report free from human mistakes. Although human error was the primary 
problem that he identified, the underlying problem of keeping time in the report is 
the lack of ‘civilisation.’68 Assam was not densely populated and had a very small 
European population. Because of the lack of British government and citizens, it 
did not have as many telegraph lines or tracks running through it like other, bigger 
cities did. Between British constructions was data that Oldham did not know how 
to read. The remoteness of the earthquake was the problem because, according to 
the methodology, the closer an earthquake occurs to metropoles, the more visible 
it becomes.  
 Oldham’s greatest tool was the government’s communication systems and 
the newspapers. Gathering information from several informants, both inside and 
outside the colonial system made his report possible. Even with a large team and 
generous funding, conducting a seismological survey was time consuming and 
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tedious. Oldham had just himself and a team of a few other geologists to survey 
almost half of the subcontinent. Compounding the problem of space was the 
urgency to get the survey done as quickly as possible. In Mallet’s letter requesting 
funding from the Royal Society to conduct his Neapolitan Survey, he said that to 
avoid the earthquake being “lost to Science...the examination must be made with 
all possible promptitude, as every hour alters or removes the characters of the 
terrible inscription which we are to decipher, and renders circumstantial, local, 
and oral evidence less trustworthy.”69 The potential loss of evidence, whether 
through erosion or repairs, was a major problem for Oldham. It was impossible 
for one person, or even for his small team of geologists, to conduct the survey 
adequately on their own. They relied on information gathered from people who 
had lived through the earthquake and who were familiar with the landscape.  
Oldham gathered information in India, Myanmar, Bangladesh, and 
Europe. From south Asia, he needed to know where to find changes in the 
landscape, the appearance of and intervals between seismic waves, and 
phenomena that had occurred during or immediately after the earthquake, but that 
had subsequently subsided or disappeared. All of this information needed to be 
gathered from local informants. From local populations, he learned both about 
subtle and major landscape changes. They were able to tell him what small lakes 
were new, which hillsides had slipped off, and how the elevations of hills had 
changed. From these testimonies and his own observations, he could analyze how 
the earthquake left its mark on the surface of the earth, determining where the 
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likely epicenter was located. Based on these testimonies, he ordered a resurvey by 
the Trigonometrical Survey of the area.70  
 Although he initially discredited several observations that showed up in 
his father's report of the Cachar earthquake which he had labelled "ordinary 
unscientific descriptions,"71 he included several similar descriptions and 
observations in his own report. Most of these letters were from European officials 
and missionaries, and contained descriptions of the seismic waves, and 
descriptions of other phenomena, like sand geysers.72 He never acknowledged that 
these wave and movement descriptions were helpful, yet they became important 
later in his career as a seismologist. Although most changes to the landscape 
could later be verified by observation (many tea plantations were covered in 
sand), the nature and duration of sand geysers and other phenomena could only be 
had through written testimonies and letters. In all instances, informers tried to 
verify their testimony either by describing instrumental changes that backed up 
their observations, or by providing other peoples' impressions to corroborate their 
own. Oldham's survey followed the reports he received, in addition to scoping out 
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places he thought might yield information. Mostly, however, he followed up the 
informants’ proof in an effort to verify. In other words, Oldham's report was 
largely directed by the reports of the public. 
 Oldham also corresponded with observers in Europe. He includes most of 
the information from this correspondence in his last chapter "The Unfelt 
Earthquake," which Charles Davison retroactively labelled the most important 
chapter because of its use of instruments.73 In this section, he recorded the way 
various instruments across Europe reacted to the Assam earthquake. He labeled 
these unfelt but recorded waves “cryptoseismic” waves.74 He noted the time and 
impact on every instrument from pendula to springs. Using the data gathered from 
Europe, he noted how earthquake waves travel through the earth’s interior. He 
hoped that this would tell him something about the structure of the interior of the 
earth, as well as its inner mechanics. Oldham's last chapter showed geophysics’ 
potential for having a worldwide network of instruments and observers. 
Both the newspapers and the telegraph were imperative for requesting and 
collecting information. Besides personal letters, government correspondence, and 
official reports, most discussion of the earthquake took place in the newspapers, 
both those printed in India and abroad. The public used the newspaper to read 
about a disaster, but also to verify their own impressions. By corroborating their 
story with others, they crafted a narrative of the earthquake that was published in 
newspapers both in India and in Britain. Other newspapers picked up the story 
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too, including papers in the United States.75 Although Oldham pulled a lot of his 
information from newspapers, he did not trust this public-crafted narrative. He 
believed that the crowd, instead of creating an accurate report through 
corroboration, created a narrative that maybe agreed with others, but not with 
reality.76 Crowdsourced knowledge in a colony, he believed, was inherently 
inaccurate. Despite his frustration with the newspaper narrative, Oldham still 
sourced several reports from them and used them as a way to send his circulars to 
the public, asking them to answer a set of questions about the quake. The 
telegraph was also key. He used this to request information from people working 
within the colonial system. One of the decisions he had to make in the colonial 
setting was how to deal with Indian testimonies.  
The Indian Voice 
Seismologists had to address the inclusion of human, and more 
specifically Indian, observations in their reports. Part of calibrating seismology 
outside of Europe was deciding how to deal with public observations, an essential 
part of observational seismology. Seismologists had to decide how much trust to 
place in such observers and decide how scientific and objective they could expect 
the public to be. To understand how scientists worked with Indians to create the 
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earthquake report, it is necessary to analyze the paradoxical position of the Indian 
voice in the report. British geologists and informants could not have completed 
the report without gathering observations from Indians, but they also actively 
worked to silence or control the Indian voice throughout the report. They included 
information gathered from Indians while simultaneously undermining the 
credibility of Indians themselves. This resulted in some adjustments unique to the 
seismological methods and report in India, including most notably an almost 
obsessive focus on verifying information. 
In several of the narratives R. D. Oldham collected about the 1897 
earthquake, the reporters noted the fearful reaction of the Indians. In these letters, 
their fearful cries are reduced to a general, panicked, Indian voice. This is the 
reaction expected by the British of the Indians. It was (from their perspective) 
religious, panicked, and unreasonable, not suitable evidence to include in a report 
“from a scientific point of view alone.”77 Oldham, and the reporters he read, did 
not consider the Indian voice able to provide an accurate assessment of a natural 
disaster, so it could not be used as an index of the earthquake’s severity. The 
newspapers published several stories of the inability of dark-skinned people to 
cope with, let alone scientifically observe, an earthquake. One striking anecdote 
about an earthquake that occurred in 1762 describes how fear damaged or even 
killed some people: 
The native account says that the earthquake began at Chittagong with a 
gentle motion which ‘increased to so violent a degree, for about two 
minutes, that the tree, hills and houses shook so severely that it was with 
difficulty many could keep their feet, and some of the black people were 
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thrown to the ground, whose fears operated so powerfully that they died 
on the spot; others, again, were so greatly affected that they have not 
recovered themselves since.78 
 
Although this account describes an earthquake that had happened more than 100 
years before, they proceeded to compare the effects of the earthquake to the 1897 
disaster: “It cannot escape the reader’s notice how precisely similar in their effects 
that and the late earthquake appear to have been.”79 Fear could kill the ‘sensitive’ 
Indians. This sensitivity seemed to work only one way, however. The Indians, 
according to the British imagination, could not harness their sensitivity to become 
expert earthquake observers, better than any European. The earthquake simply 
made them too fearful and irrational to objectively observe it. 
 Living in an earthquake prone area, Europeans believed, was one reason 
that the Indians could not be trusted to observe their own earthquakes. According 
to nineteenth-century speculation, people living in seismic areas were prone to all 
sorts of moral, mental, and physical failings. In humans, earthquakes created a 
“state of mind [that] becomes unfavourable for the maintenance of a high 
civilization. The best conditions of the state can only be secured when the laborer 
toils with the assurance that his work will endure long after his own brief life is 
over.”80 As “natural terrorisms,” earthquakes generated both intense and constant 
anxiety as well as apathy about the future.81 Milne devoted a section of his 
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introductory book on seismology to explaining the effects of seismic activities on 
“morals and mentalities:”  
A disastrous shock will throw the weaker members of a community into a 
state of terror or hysterics, and at every little shock, perhaps, for the 
remainder of their lives they will either be so far unnerved that the do not 
move, or else, seized with alarm, they will seek a place of safety. I am 
acquainted with two cases which, in consequence of the nervous 
excitement produced by comparatively small disturbances, terminated 
fatally…[with the regular occurrence of earthquakes] it would seem 
natural that ideas of permanency would be destroyed, a carelessness for 
the future might be engendered, and timidity might be established amongst 
the weaker members of a community which would handicap them in the 
struggle for existence. The general temperament of a nation is no doubt 
largely due to its environment, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that 
serenity of demeanour and carelessness of the future may hold some 
relationship to repeated exhibitions of seismic and volcanic energy.82 
 
Milne wrote that earthquakes did not affect every race in the same way. 
Europeans were prone to mental weaknesses, such as loss of nerves and hysteria, 
while the Japanese were susceptible to physical consequences like tetanus and 
complications of the spine.83 The effects on Indians were supposedly mainly 
mental, and their resulting actions differed widely, with the extremes being either 
panicking themselves to death (as the 1762 anecdote describes) or continuing with 
their work as if nothing had happened.84 At no point on this scale of reactions 
would Indians qualify as competent and trustworthy observers.  
The documentation of Indian reactions appears in nearly every letter 
included in the report. The Assam plains people, in “horrified alarm,” fled to the 
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hills.85 The Garos, living near the epicenter of the earthquake, “were thrown into a 
state of stolid bewilderment.”86 The villagers “were panic-stricken,”87 seemed 
“most helpless,”88 and of those that fled towards Lakhipur and found the way 
flooded, “the poor creatures got more alarmed than ever.”89 Aftershocks evoked 
“a wail of human voices.”90 Although not helpful as evidence that would be used 
in categorizing the earthquake’s severity, these accounts served important 
functions in the narratives. The European reporters defined themselves in 
opposition to this oriental voice, setting boundaries between the observer and the 
observed. By observing the Indians’ reactions as part of the effects of the 
earthquake, they depicted themselves as the calm, rational observers, and the 
Indians as the chaotic objects of observation. The Indians were positioned as a 
part of nature, a part of the effects of the earthquake, but not the observers. As 
Kama Maclean argued in her chapter The Art of Panicking Quietly, “[i]n India, 
the maintenance of a certain mien that performed notions of authority and 
dominance became a management strategy and a method of containing anxieties 
and fears attended by imperialism.”91 Maintaining a calm disposition, especially 
in the face of colonial panic, was an important duty for a Briton. The colonial 
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order, they seemed to feel, rested on their ability to remain calm in emergency 
situations.  
The same standards did not apply to Europe. Human reaction was 
embedded in the scale used to ascertain earthquake intensity and was an 
acceptable and important part of any earthquake report. Letters written to 
seismologists included even the subtlest and seemingly unimportant details, such 
as the falling over of a toy soldier.92 Women’s reactions were considered 
particularly useful, since women were supposed to be more sensitive than men.93 
The Rossi-Forel Scale assumed a standard human reaction to earthquakes of 
varying severity. For example, “general awakening” and “startled persons leave 
their dwellings” were parts of a level 5 earthquake, and “general panic” was an 
important effect of a level 7 earthquake.94 The same standards, in Oldham’s 
opinion, could not be applied to Indian bodies or responses. In the human element 
of his scale, earthquakes are merely ‘noticed’ by increasingly large amounts of 
people.95 Because of the general distrust of Indian reactions, Oldham made them 
unimportant with his scale. 
Thomas Oldham, in his record of the Cachar earthquake, also hints at 
another reason why he found the Indian voice untrustworthy. After the 1869 
shock, the Indians carried on with what they were doing or quickly resumed 
activities. This was not helpful for seismological research because observational 
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seismology is based on the observations of the effects caused by an earthquake; 
something that did not ‘record’ an earthquake, then, was useless. Once the danger 
was over, the Indians voice was no longer a useful recorder of the shock. In 
Thomas Oldham’s notes, after “…violently gasping out their short exclamations 
of entreaty or worship,” the Indians “quieted down to their wonted occupations as 
if nothing had happened [emphasis added].”96 A cook, during the 1897 
earthquake, also did not ‘register’ the earthquake. 
…it was amusing to find my cook busy at work preparing dinner within 
half an hour of the occurrence. There he was, as though nothing had 
occurred, on the plinth of a burnt down hut only just above the water and 
surrounded on all sides by it. I was very grateful to him later on for not 
having parted with his wits.97 
 
Although Surgeon-Major E. F. H. Dobson praises his cook’s calm reaction in his 
letter, he is also noticing that his cook had not registered the earthquake in any 
recordable way; the cook had not adjusted his behavior even though he had 
experienced one of the strongest earthquakes on record. This non-reaction echoes 
the geologist’s frustration with Indian architecture that did not record the quake in 
a way that the British would recognize. 
“Ignorant and illiterate tribes,” as R. D. Oldham termed them, were also a 
problem.98 Of the areas of land that were affected by the Assam Earthquake, 
Oldham could only survey approximately one-third of it. One-third could be 
surveyed, one-third was where the ‘ignorant and illiterate’ tribes lived, and one-
third could not be surveyed, whether that was because it was in dangerous terrain, 
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such as the Himalayan mountains, or because it lay outside of Britain’s political 
boundaries. Because of the communication and education barrier, Oldham 
decided that it would not be worth the time to question the tribes. There were, he 
said, 
…but few and widely separated centres from which an intelligent account 
could be hoped for…any attempt to have obtained this information would 
undoubtedly have occupied much time, besides being almost foredoomed 
to failure, so the attempt was deliberately abandoned in order that attention 
might be given to those points with regard to which this earthquake 
seemed likely to add to our knowledge.99 
 
He excused himself by emphasizing the incommensurability of their language and 
ability to give scientific, objective, and accurate accounts of the earthquake. 
Native knowledge, he implied, could add nothing valuable to the British or 
European theories about earthquakes. Their experience, including any deaths 
outside of the cities, went unrecorded, silenced by Oldham’s report. His statement 
about their ignorance is ironic, especially considering his dependence on local 
knowledge to complete the earthquake report. 
Several chapters in the report explain in detail the changes to the 
landscape of the Garo Hills and surrounding areas, changes he relied on locals to 
observe and describe, although he rarely mentions it. For example, he found a 
pool that he believed had not been there before. “In reply to an enquiry of my 
guide I was informed that there was no pool here before the earthquake.”100 The 
order is important here; Oldham first emphasizes that he noticed the unique nature 
of the pool, inferred it was caused by the earthquake, and then verified his 
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conclusion with his guide. In reality, however, the order was usually switched. 
Oldham relied on local knowledge of changes that he later verified. The Garos 
and Khasis informed him of changes, then he would investigate and verify their 
claims. There were only a few new formations that would have been obvious to 
Oldham, such as fissures. Otherwise, local knowledge was all he had to begin 
investigating. He also hints at the importance of local knowledge when he 
discusses the “ignorant and illiterate tribes.” Part of the problem was that these 
areas were “sparsely inhabited.”101 Without several informers, Oldham did not 
know where to begin. The landscape itself did not lend itself to easy observation. 
It was covered in thick bamboo forests and jungles. Oldham notes that the rate of 
travel in the jungles, once one left the path, was about one-third of a mile per 
hour.102 This made simply happening upon a new geological change caused by the 
earthquake highly unlikely. The impenetrability of the landscape meant that he 
had to work closely with Indian locals, who could identify recent changes because 
of their familiarity with the topography. The existence of this close partnership is 
suppressed in the report and must be inferred from Oldham’s occasional revealing 
statements. 
Not all the local knowledge was based on noticing the specific geological 
differences. Sometimes the changes were inferred because of other landscape 
changes. The local communities had their own methods of reading the landscape 
to detect subtle and sudden changes. They taught these methods to Oldham, who 
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appropriated them as proofs in his report. One example is bamboo. Bamboo is 
sensitive to sudden changes in water and soil and will die if the changes are too 
drastic. When the earthquake struck, some bamboo was killed in clumps, 
indicating that a change had taken place. The Indians pointed this out to Oldham 
as proof of what they observed. Oldham took this knowledge about bamboo and 
turned it into a seismological index unique to India.103 Although it had foiled him 
in his attempts at reading architectural damage in India, bamboo became an 
important index, verifying landscape changes. 
Even though he rarely acknowledged the Indian knowledge, he was 
always careful to verify their claims. He understood that others would recognize 
where he got his information, and a report based on Indian knowledge was not 
much better than nothing. Thomas Oldham spent most of the first half of his 
career verifying geological information gathered by army surgeons, who gathered 
most of their information from Indians. He specifically tried to remove the Indian 
knowledge element from these reports and systematize them; it was only later, 
after Oldham had verified all of the information with European geologists that the 
GSI became a premier and globally relevant scientific institution.104 Later, R. D. 
Oldham was careful to verify all of the Indian information, aware that if the report 
was going to be accepted as an important document of an earthquake by the entire 
scientific community, dependence on Indian knowledge was not enough. By 
masking the origins of the knowledge and only including the instances that he 
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could verify, R. D. Oldham undermined and quieted the critically important 
Indian knowledge contained in his book; without it, his report would not have 
been the landmark report it turned out to be. 
But verifying the reports was only necessary when they were given by 
Indians. Oldham accepted reports from the Welsh Baptist missionaries, who were 
also living near the Garos, as true. Although he also included proof of their 
information, the proof was provided by the missionaries, and was presented in a 
different order. Mr. and Mrs. Evans, the missionaries, informed Oldham that new 
stretches of the road could be seen after the earthquake that they could not see 
before, meaning that the altitude of the hills had changed. Oldham presented this 
information first as fact. It was only after that he informed readers that the Evans 
had verified their observations with a test. 
…a few days after the great earthquake Mr. Evans took a piece of board 
and nailed it to a stout post in such a position that its upper edge was 
sighted on to the crest of a ridge about one and a half mile to the west. 
When I saw it, at the end of December, six months after the earthquake, 
the top edge of the board no longer pointed to the crest of this ridge, but to 
some way down its slope…These tracts are of interest as suggesting that 
no inconsiderable fraction of the total movements which have taken place, 
were accompaniments of the large number of severe aftershocks.105 
 
Oldham accepted the Evans’s information as true; the Indian guides and informers 
did not get the same amount of trust. He did act based on both the Indians’ and 
missionaries’ observation however. Because of their reports, Oldham decided that 
the landscape had changed enough that resurveying was necessary. He reordered a 
Trigonometrical Survey of the area, although it was not carried out very well.106 
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One of Oldham’s most important observational tools was the imperial 
network of communication. With railway and telegraph stations across the 
subcontinent, he could request information about how strongly the earthquake 
was felt at each location, the time it was felt, and proof to verify the statement. 
The empire employed several Indians at these centers, so Oldham worked with 
both European and Indian reporters within the colonial system. In the appendix of 
his report, he includes reports collected from these stations. He sent circulars, via 
the press and telegraph network, and requested letters from officers working for 
the government. The language of the circulars was prescriptive. One circular he 
sent required information about: “(a) Extent of fissuring (b) Outpouring of sand 
and water (c) Filling up of river channels (d) Opening out of new khals.”107 These 
circulars required specific, regulated responses, most of which Oldham used in his 
report. Because they were so prescriptive, he believed he had eliminated the 
human bias, or enough of it that he did not have to worry about inaccuracies 
sneaking in. These reports were essential for timing the earthquakes. Because the 
stations needed to have clocks, most reporters were able to give a fairly accurate 
time the earthquake was felt. The Calcutta telegraph office transmitted the time to 
other telegraph stations every morning, daily calibrating the time across the 
subcontinent. Ideally, government officers adjusted their own timepieces to match 
the telegraph station’s clock, but Oldham discovered that at distant outposts, these 
careful calibrations were often ignored. This proximity to technology also lead the 
reports another step away from the human element of seismology towards a more 
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instrumental and global science. The best reports described when and how the 
observer checked his watch, and how accurate the watch was. For example, “as 
we got up [from being knocked over by the earthquake] I looked at my watch and 
noted the time 5 hours 6-7 minutes P.M. Calcutta time.”108 Even if the time could 
not be determined, the informers wrote it:  
There being no telegraph wire to Tura, there is no means of checking our 
local time. We depend chiefly on a sundial, but as it was inaccurately put 
up, the result is unreliable.”109  
 
Oldham depended on the daily time calibrations across the subcontinent to 
measure the rate the earthquake waves traveled, and for how long they lasted. The 
colonial networks functioned not only as a network of earthquake observers, but 
also as a network of instrument observers. Because the language of the circulars 
was prescriptive, Oldham did not discriminate between reports from Indian 
officials and those from British officials. As long as the Indian voice was 
regulated by British systems and networks, it was an acceptable form of scientific 
proof. 
Uncharacteristically, Oldham includes a letter written by Babu Hiranmoy 
Mukerji, who was probably a wealthy Indian from Muktagacha in Bangladesh. 
Mukerji submitted a letter reporting the earthquake, sent soil samples, identified 
the cause of the earthquake, and suggested measures the government could take to 
prevent further catastrophe. Mukerji pointed out that because the wealthy live in 
stone or brick-built houses, and own plantations, they have suffered the most.110 
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He suggests two principle causes for the earthquake. The first is natural, the 
second moral.  
The earthquake is commonly calculated by the Hindus according to a 
formula quoted below:- 
‘If you get famine, drought and plague in one and the same year, 
you get the earthquake that year.’ 
This calculation has indeed been verified.111 
 
The second cause was a lapse in morality. A supernatural agency is “put into 
action by the vice or virtue of mankind.”112 Mukerji suggests that the British law 
of religious toleration has allowed people not to follow their religion carefully. He 
asserts that “any man in any community should not be allowed to violate with 
impunity the ordinances of the religion which has been accepted by that 
community.”113 He argues that coercing people to align their actions with their 
community’s religious practices (although they were free to convert to other 
religions) would prevent future earthquakes. 
Oldham may have included this letter, as he hints, out of respect and duty, 
but he did not include it because it provided critical scientific observations. This is 
the only time he includes an unmoderated, unmodified, and unverified Indian 
letter. Perhaps he did this because of its religious nature. Left on their own, it 
seems to imply, Indians can try to replicate Western science, and even provide 
some useful details and data, but ultimately, they draw the wrong scientific 
conclusions, conflate natural and supernatural causes, and suggest archaic and 
ineffective solutions that contradict the supposed modernity the British Empire 
                                                 




was trying to implement. He introduces Mukerji as part of an “important section 
of our fellow subjects,” but not part of the knowledge building community.114 
Mukerji is little more than an informant from Bangladesh. Where the Indian voice 
was most obvious in the earthquake report, it is not included as a serious, but as a 
“dutiful” addition; it promotes the idea of the apparently fundamental unscientific 
nature of Indian observations. 
Gyan Prakash, in his book Another Reason, suggests a reason for this in 
his discussion about museums in India. He argues that the British faced a dilemma 
when bringing and exhibiting their science to India. They wanted the Indians to 
recognize the authority of Western knowledge, but they were also reluctant “to 
acknowledge them as knowing subjects,” which resulted in the British having “to 
regard Indians as always less than adequate, always lacking some key attribute. 
This justified colonial dominance, but it also conceded that the colonial project 
would never achieve complete success, that Indians would remain unconquerable 
in the last instance.”115 The inclusion of this letter, then, may have partially been 
to justify Oldham’s control of the Indian voice and to imply to other European 
seismologists the specific difficulties of conducting observational seismology in 
India. European seismologists relied heavily on reports, respecting the public 
observers’ contributions as valuable and necessary components of doing science.  
From the exclusively imperial point of view, Indians were not active, 
questioning participants in creating and contesting knowledge. They were, in the 
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report and letters, little more than uneducated informants, simply providing the 
requested information with no speculation about its meaning. Looking outside of 
the British network gives us a very different understanding of how Indians 
understood and participated in earthquake observation. Admittedly, the instances 
of Indians commenting on the 1897 earthquake outside of the government 
network are difficult to find, but some examples appear in nationalist newspapers. 
Indians weighed in on the science of the earthquake outside of the constraints of 
imperial surveys. One example is a letter to the editor of the Amrita Bazar Patrika 
by Jagadananda Roy (1869-1933), a science writer, teacher, and science fiction 
author. He wrote a short, poignant, and insightful piece critiquing a previous 
contributor’s conclusion.116 He believed that because of the nature of waves, the 
other informant, identified as “Dwfdt,” had drawn the wrong conclusion while 
watching a wall sway in Krishnagar. Roy’s letter to the editor shows that many 
Indians did have a working knowledge of seismological theories. His letter 
challenges the image of Indians as scientifically incapable since he critiques 
conclusions based on his own careful observations and a solid understanding of 
earthquake waves. This differs sharply from the image of Indians’ inferior 
scientific ability Oldham was trying to create. Obviously, it did not accurately 
reflect the knowledge that many Indians had about the earthquake or their ‘ability’ 
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to contribute and critique science in a meaningful way. This was not a nation 
devoid of competent and capable observers by European standards.  
The answers to the questions of how to include Indian observations 
depended heavily on ideas about race and the power structure of empire. It is also 
important to consider the international reputation of a scientist. Could trusting 
observers too much jeopardize the international significance and credibility of a 
scientific report, and through the report, the scientist himself? Oldham seemed to 
think so. In several of his works, Oldham critiqued the use of human observations. 
For example, he condescendingly suggested that the increasing number of 
earthquake reports in newspapers was a phenomenon that should be studied by a 
psychologist rather than a seismologist, as the increasing attention to earthquakes 
was not a result of increasingly frequent earth tremors.117 He identified the divide 
between geology and geography, which was “determined by absence or existence 
of human records” as “illogical and unworkable, or, in a word, unscientific.”118 
Geographers, because of their dependence on human records, were less scientific 
than those who did not define their limits according to human records. According 
to Oldham, any science based on human observation was by nature unscientific. 
He, however, was still dependent on human observations. This required him to 
engage in a careful balancing act of building an internationally credible scientific 
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report while simultaneously undermining the data he used, pointing out how his 
report was scientific despite its use of observations. 
Other Institutions 
Other institutions, such as the tea plantations, exacerbated the effects of 
the earthquake. Although they did not feature prominently in Oldham’s report, 
they provide further proof that the British empire in Assam increased the 
destructive potential of the earthquake. Oldham noted many of these effects but 
did not know how to read them as indices, so they remained simple observations. 
When confronted with phenomena that did not fit his methodology or his 
mathematical formulae, Oldham was reduced to the role of informant in his own 
report. For the sake of thoroughness, he included them but did not have the tools 
or epistemology to interpret them.  
 Since the 1840s, the British had been removing trees from the lowlands 
near the Brahmaputra River and cultivating tea.119 The trees were used for railway 
ties, and the cleared area was repurposed for growing crops. Although the empire 
did take measures to make the timber market sustainable in Assam, their efforts 
were not very effective.120 “Tens of thousands of acres of jungle and wasteland 
were converted into private estates, inhabited by labourers, Indian clerical staff, 
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and European managers and their assistants."121 In addition to deforestation, the 
British increased the population density of the area by importing labor to work the 
plantations. Originally, the Assam lowlands were sparsely populated, the majority 
of the population living in the hills. The local population had little interest in 
working on the plantations, so the owners were forced to outsource the labor, 
shipping in people from across India and Bangladesh.  
Keeping the labor force in Assam was one of the most difficult tasks of the 
plantations managers and supervisors. With the appalling working conditions, 
high mortality rate, and a below subsistence wage that was almost never paid in 
full, many Indians who worked on the plantations tried to escape. The plantations 
managers resorted to extra-legal coercion to keep the Indians on the plantations, 
including flogging and imprisonment if caught trying to run away.122 By the 
1940s, Assam had a population of more than three-quarters of a million, and the 
tea plantations employed more than 60% percent of them. The tea industry in 
Assam was one of the few industries in its more than 100-year history that "never 
suffered from a complete stoppage of production during its long history."123 The 
earthquake triggered flooding in the lowlands and fissures that erupted sand. The 
sand and water destroyed many of the tea plants and made several acres of land 
uncultivable. But overall, the earthquake did not do much to stop tea production. 
The output had a couple bad years, but it had increased its output by more than 
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250% between 1885 and 1901, increasing from 53.5 million pounds of tea 
exported to 134 million pounds.124 
 Recent studies have documented the connection between deforestation and 
earthquake devastation, including the increasing likelihood and extent of 
landslides and rockfall during and immediately following an earthquake.125 The 
Indian and Bangladeshi who worked on the tea plantations were the ones who 
suffered the most. In Sylhet, several people drowned or were buried under mud 
and sand when the riverbank gave way.126 The Administration report estimated 
about 545 people dying because of the collapse.127 The deforested soil in the 
lowlands became unstable as a result of the earthquake, causing liquefaction and 
extensive fissuring. The loose riverbank subsided, leading to extensive flooding as 
well. Although it is unclear the extent to which deforestation contributed to the 
tragic situations in the lowlands, it is reasonable to say that it did have some 
effect. By increasing the population density in that area and destabilizing the soil, 
the British empire probably increased the danger of the earthquake. 
 Damage to food and water supply infrastructures also caused problems for 
the population. Damage to the water reservoirs and drainage exacerbated or 
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resulted in an outbreak of cholera in the Brahmaputra Valley, as well as “an 
epidemic fever which caried off 79,524 persons in Cachar and Sylhet, [which 
was] more than double the mortality from this cause in 1896.”128 Some food 
stocks were destroyed, but “it was much less than was at first feared would be the 
case.”129 The surviving harvest was good, so anyone that could work on food 
production (in the Administration's words, “willing to work”130) had enough food. 
Consequently, the province decided that it would devote its funds to repairing 
colonial infrastructures rather than giving money to relief.131 Although they listed 
“hous[ing] the houseless” and “feed[ing] the people” as their two most urgent 
priorities, it was their third and final priority, “re-open[ing] communications” that 
received the most funds.132 The administration hoped that with this redistribution 
of funds, the public works would be repaired within three years.133 Because of the 
failed supplies, disease devastated the valley, and the reassignment of relief funds 
from the population to infrastructures the empire exacerbated the problem. 
 Besides deforestation, the railway directly affected the landscape and 
made the earthquake visible. Oldham noticed that the earth had fissured parallel to 
train tracks and roads. He noted that, 
…the heaping up of an embankment on the surface of the alluvium 
produces a line of weakness along its base on either side. Besides this 
cause of weakness, we have the fact that the material for the embankment 
is usually derived from a row of borrow-pits on either side of the bank. 
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These two causes acting together give rise to a special aptitude for 
fracture, and we find nearly everywhere throughout northern Bengal and 
lower Assam that the roads and railway lines were bounded on either side 
by a set of fissures running parallel to the road in all such places where 
fractures have not, for other reasons, been formed across the road.134 
 
The colonial altering of the landscape fissured the ground. The British broke their 
own empire.  
 All of these effects, although they showed the damaged caused by 
imperialism and its technologies and infrastructures, did not fit neatly into 
observational methodology. Oldham did not know how to read them as indices of 
the earthquake. 
Conclusion 
The modifications to observational seismology suggested by Oldham 
resulted in a type of colonial seismology. There were several elements that stayed 
the same, such the reliance on communication systems and observing Western 
technology and buildings. This adherence meant that Oldham was mostly limited 
to observing the damage to the empire, rather than analyzing the earthquake as a 
disaster for everyone in northeast India. But he also changed the methodology to 
fit the local situation. The modifications were driven much more by social than 
physical reasons. Maintaining the hierarchy of power accounts for many of the 
differences between colonial and European observational seismology. First, 
Oldham changed the scale. This was not uncommon, as several geologists 
modified the Rossi-Forel scale.135 However, although Oldham used the lack of 
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brick and stone buildings as the primary reason for changing the scale, the most 
important change was the elimination of human reaction, merely including 
whether anyone had felt the earthquake. This meant that Indian reaction could not 
be used as an official index of the earthquake’s intensity. European seismologists, 
on the other hand, depended on this human element, valuing even the smallest 
details of how an earthquake affected the body. Although they could not be 
officially used, the report turns the Indian, and especially the Indian crowd, into 
an object of observation. The Indians themselves were not valued as observers 
and informers unless they were working within the colonial system.  
The Indians, however, found their own proofs of how the earthquake 
changed the landscape and passed this knowledge on to Oldham, who disguised 
its origins and presented it as a purely rational way to observe an earthquake. 
Indigenous methods became an important part of colonial seismology. Along with 
the inclusion of indigenous knowledge came an almost obsessive need to verify 
Indian observations. Unlike European observations, Oldham framed Indian 
observations as secondary corroboration to his own primary observations. The 
trust and respect between seismologist and public observer was absent in India if 
the observer was an Indian; in Europe, this trust and communication was essential 
for doing seismology. Although Oldham’s report is “one of the most careful and 
detailed [observational seismology reports] that we possess,”136 its unique 
methodology meant that the effects of the earthquake on the local indigenous 
population and their contributions to his report were downplayed to the point of 
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being almost invisible. Ironically, the interior of the earth and its mechanics, 
something that Oldham would never actually see, became more visible than the 
people who he talked with and learned from.  
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Chapter 3: Oldham and the ‘New Seismology’ 
The 1897 earthquake was a moment in seismology where the British and 
the Indians had an opportunity to collaboratively build a new type of 
methodology. Instead, Oldham believed that the better option would be to use the 
earthquake survey as an argument for moving seismology in an instrumental, and 
thus geophysical, direction. This, he believed, would allow seismologists across 
the globe to work on earthquake data simultaneously, provide data for answering 
fundamental questions of geophysics, allow seismology to transcend place, lessen 
seismologists’ dependence on public collaboration, measure more than the earth’s 
crust, and make collecting earthquake data from across the globe quicker and 
easier. The instrumental seismology that resulted replicated many of the colonial 
practices embedded in his report, including the invisibility of Indian informants, 
the missed opportunity to use local knowledge to mitigate earthquake devastation, 
and the loss of collaboration between the public and scientists. When compared 
with the situation in Japan, where Milne and Ōmori used instruments but also 
focused on collaboration and the practical uses of seismological knowledge, the 
difference is striking.   
 Oldham’s earthquake report was an argument for what he thought 
seismology needed to be a science of. In his mind, the differences (with the 
European experience) of doing seismology in a colony was an impediment rather 
than an opportunity. No matter how ‘civilized,’ colonies were not conducive to 
conducting seismology, and especially observational seismology. He showed that 
unless colonies had European structures and infrastructures, seismologists could 
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not conduct observational seismological surveys, which limited them to their 
heavily ‘developed’ colonies. Earthquake reports needed to be written in spite of 
colonial circumstances. Oldham made it clear that collecting information from 
Indian informants was at best inconclusive and at worst untrustworthy. The best 
way to solve these problems, he argued, was to install seismographs at key points 
on the subcontinent. Removing everything that made the Indian earthquake 
‘Indian’ would, he believed, make seismology more objective and intellectually 
pure. Doing macro-seismology in a colony required researchers, according to 
Oldham, to strip seismology’s tools and methods down to the skeletal basics. 
Observational seismology could not keep up with the increasingly sophisticated 
new science, and colonialism only exacerbated the problem. Because of the 
discrepancies in architecture, infrastructure, language, communication systems, 
and supposed human reactions, colonial surveys were more difficult and less 
informative.  
 He argued that instruments, imperfect as they were at this point, were 
better for seismology than fieldwork observations. Instruments allowed 
seismologists to record precise measurements and times. Further, the conclusions 
that seismologists could draw from instrumental data gave evidence of the interior 
workings and composition of the earth. It did not matter so much that the 
instruments themselves were not perfect, or that some instruments that were used 
as seismographs were not even designed for that purpose. His report and later 
work on the earth’s core and seismic waves demonstrated that instruments were 
good enough to justify the switch from observational seismology to the ‘new’ 
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seismology, as his contemporaries termed it.137 But seismographs came with a 
new set of epistemological and technical questions and problems. Seismologists 
were experimenting with and inventing several types of instruments, trying to 
determine what a good seismograph measured and what constituted an accurate 
seismogram. Instrumental seismology traded perceived human error for 
instrumental error, privileging instrumental inscriptions above human experience.  
 Oldham did not invent the dichotomy between observational and 
instrumental seismology. As Oldham was tramping around the Garo Hills 
collecting data, seismology was in a state of flux. Scientists were debating 
whether seismological observations primarily needed to be gathered in the field or 
in the observatory, whether seismology was more of a geophysical or 
geographical science, what role instruments should have in observations, and 
whether seismology should be a purely intellectual or a heavily applied science. 
Oldham’s report was his response to this debate from a colonial seismologist’s 
point of view. The intricate differences of doing seismology in colonies was an 
important point of consideration for seismologists trying to determine what type 
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of science seismology was. As Coen says, “imperialism motivated and structured 
internationalism in seismology.”138  
Collecting data from around the world allowed seismologists to see how 
seismic waves propagated through different types of materials on the surface. 
From this, they could begin to guess about the material construction of the interior 
of the earth. As Oldham showed, if a seismologist had data on one earthquake 
from several instruments at different points of the globe, they could evaluate how 
waves traveled through the earth. They also hoped it would help them understand 
the cause(s) of earthquakes, such as whether they were tectonic in origin or 
caused by a subterranean explosion. By tracking the movements of the earth, 
seismologists hoped that they would be able to establish a sequence of events that 
led up to an earthquake, potentially allowing seismologists to predict 
earthquakes.139 As scientists acknowledged the necessity of earthquake data from 
all over the earth, the colonies were their main points of contact to gather this 
information. The data from colonies was an indispensable part of making 
seismology a truly global science. Although the necessity of observations in 
colonies was obvious, the methods to collect information were less so. 
Seismologists were trying to decide what seismology would need to look like to 
best accommodate all locations and goals for the discipline. 
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Seismology circa 1900: The Debate 
During the very beginning of the twentieth century, scientists decided to 
form the International Association of Seismology (ISA) in an “example of 
building an international organization and running collaborative projects.”140 By 
1904 the ISA was up and running. Seismologists realized that to understand the 
inner workings and composition of the earth by using earthquake data, they would 
need information about earthquakes from around the world. Indeed, the ISA 
stated that one of its most important functions was to publish thorough up-to-date 
catalogues of worldwide earthquakes.141 The main question, then, was how to best 
go about collecting information. Coen identifies the basic debate in seismology as 
whether the science needed to continue with its fieldwork focus or shift the bulk 
of the work to observatories. Fieldwork was the main data gathering activity of 
macro-seismologists, who believed that examining the surface of the earth and 
secondary effects yielded useful results to seismology and society. Observatory 
work, which used primarily instruments, was the main activity of micro-
seismologists (or, as Oldham wanted to call them, crypto-seismologists) as they 
believed that instrumental inscriptions yielded the best information about 
earthquakes from around the world. The underlying question was whether 
seismology fit more appropriately as a subdiscipline of geology or as a 
subdiscipline of geophysics. If a type of geology, then it was more important to 
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spend the most effort engaged in fieldwork, and if a geophysics discipline, then it 
was more appropriate to stay in an observatory and monitor instruments.  
As Helen Tilley warns, it would be inappropriate to draw “too sharp a 
dichotomy between laboratory and field methods, since many disciplines relied on 
both techniques…[t]he ‘field’ was essential to everyone.”142 However, Coen 
points out that seismology was an especially contentious field when it came to 
deciding whether laboratory work or fieldwork was more important.143 She argues 
that fieldwork showed seismologists the importance of “vernacular science and 
the complexity and specificity of human-environmental interactions” and that 
when it was reduced to observatories with instruments, “seismology became all 
too easy to assimilate to the simplifications of an imperialist worldview.”144 
George Gerland (1833-1919), the director of the Imperial Seismological Station in 
Strasbourg and president of the ISA, fell firmly in the camp of the seismology as 
an observatory science, while other famous geologists, such as Eduard Suess 
(1831-1914) and Fernand Montessus de Ballore (1851-1923), were more skeptical 
of Gerland’s agenda.145 Seismologists that leaned towards a fieldwork approach 
did not discount the role of instruments — they used them themselves and 
solicited instrument inscriptions from fellow seismologists — but they believed 
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that the peculiarities of each location made it necessary to get out of the 
observatory to survey each location individually. 
Fieldwork 
Macro-seismologists argued that understanding and documenting an 
earthquake as a disaster was an essential part of being a seismologist. Scientists 
had an obligation to use their science to help the regional populations, so, they 
argued, seismological fieldwork surveys needed to be conducted at the regional, 
rather than global, level.146 They hoped that by identifying places and structures 
of heightened risk, they would be able suggest real solutions to the problems.147 
This type of work was intensely collaborative, requiring seismologists from 
around the world to survey and report on earthquakes from several different 
regions around the world. It required a more or less permanent network of 
observers constantly keeping tabs on the earthquakes happening around them. 
Instead of being a network of trained instrument observers, it would need to be a 
network of geologists trained to observe earthquakes, possessing a certain amount 
of tacit knowledge that only fieldwork could hone. These types of surveys 
resulted in the isoseismic maps. As Clancey said, “The isoseismal map was the 
geographic expression of an earthquake as the seismograph was its geophysical 
one.”148 Unlike in micro-seismology, local knowledge was valuable data, and 
seismologists, especially in Switzerland, collected it along with their more 
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‘scientific’ observations.149 One reason particular to this time for choosing 
fieldwork over observatory work was to corroborate Suess’ theory of mountain 
formation.150 Fieldwork helped connect seismically active zones with 
mountainous regions, an important part of Suess’ claims.  
 Even though seismologists such as Suess and Montessus sustained macro-
seismology’s fieldwork as a necessary part of seismology and a socially 
responsible practice as well, the methods carried a lot of problems too. 
Conducting work in the field was time consuming, and seismologists had to deal 
with variations in weather and landscape. In Oldham’s case, he had to conduct the 
survey during a cold and rainy season and elected to not climb the Himalayas in 
search of evidence. He was also constrained by political boundaries. Fieldworkers 
were limited in their reach by geopolitical borders as much as physical 
boundaries. Each earthquake region presented a different set of difficulties to be 
solved by the seismologist, and each required unique adjustments to the methods, 
tools, and responses of the seismologist. They needed to not only be skilled in the 
general profession, but flexible enough to tinker with observational seismology to 
make it an appropriate fit for their region. Scales had to be adjusted according to 
the peculiarities of the location and population. As already shown, this was often 
because of social reasons as well as physical ones. Although scientists often gave 
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rough approximations between their scale and the Rossi-Forel, the result was not 
a more descriptive and thorough scale but a less informative one. The isoseismal 
maps they could draw were also less defined, and there were usually fewer levels 
of intensity. For example, Oldham’s scale only had six levels, while the Rossi-
Forel had ten.151  Seismologists struggled with trying to make a universal scale, 
with some seismologists giving up on the task, instead suggesting that each 
seismologist should come up with his own according to the situation.152 It also 
meant that the seismologist had to rely heavily on local populations and 
knowledge and trust the locals about the effects of earthquakes, their frequency, 
etc. Unless the seismologist was native to the area himself, the most efficient way 
of understanding an area was to establish communication and trust with the 
people who had lived there. This was problematic in making a global seismology, 
as data from colonial outposts began appearing in Europe but it was not as 
specific as they hoped it would be. It started tearing apart their previously 
accepted scales, but did not provide alternatives, leaving the comparative scales 
less useful and the data less specific.  
Instruments and Observatories 
Instruments, supporters reminded the public and their opponents, made 
seismology a truly international science. Seismologists hoped that by using 
instruments they would no longer have to worry about being in the right place at 
the right time to experience an earthquake and conduct a survey. With sufficiently 
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sensitive seismographs, seismologists from around the world, even those living in 
non-seismic countries, could participate in collecting and verifying information, 
and be able to engage in active debate with other seismologists in more 
earthquake-prone areas.153 Not only would this bring the science to a broader 
range of scientists, Milne argued, but it would help the discipline overall to 
accomplish its goals:  
The records of these ubiquitous breathings of the earth’s surface, the 
observation of which is at present confined to one or two observers, 
constitute a new departure in an old study, and promise to throw new light 
upon the physics of our earth’s crust and the nature of its interior.154 
 
With instruments, seismology would be able to detect and record the primary 
effects of earthquakes, or, in other words, they would be able to measure the 
magnitude of an earthquake. As shown in the previous chapter, observational 
methods depended on secondary effects, such as building damage, to measure 
earthquakes. Proponents of this ‘new’ seismology wanted to remove the 
uncertainty and margin of error that came with observational seismology, which 
Oldham emphasized in his report. Theoretically, the instruments and the scales 
could be standardized to eliminate the need for reconciling all varieties of data. 
Because it was based in an observatory and did not require hefty amounts of 
fieldwork, the observatory seismologists could produce information about 
earthquakes much more quickly than field seismologists. In addition to these 
practical benefits, seismologists believed that instrumentally and observatory-
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based scholarship made the entire discipline more scientific.155 By more scientific, 
they meant that seismology would be based more on the methods of physics 
rather than on geology. According to Gerland, by transitioning to the observatory, 
seismology would become a purely intellectual science.156 This made seismology 
a more foundational science according to Auguste Comte’s (1798-1857) 
influential hierarchy of the sciences, as it supposedly relied on more physical and 
general laws than observational seismology.157 
 But observatory seismologists faced several challenges as well. Despite 
their supposed benefits, the several types of seismographs were finicky. Because 
there were multiple types of earth movements, multiple types of seismographs 
existed to measure each. To use Wiebe E. Bijker’s term, the field had not 
achieved closure on what constituted a working seismograph and an accurate 
seismogram.158 Seismologists had not standardized these instruments, so 
seismographic data came in all varieties. As Andrea Westermann explains, the 
Seismological Association responsible for collecting information from 
seismographs across the world failed, for many years, to address the issue of 
standardizing the information flooding in. In 1909, the director explained that,  
The situation is such...that many important circles, especially in England 
and Russia, have lost confidence in the central bureau. An immense and 
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growing mass of observational data is sent to Strasbourg, but nobody is 
able to process it for further scientific interpretation.159  
 
Most of the instruments were still being tested in Japan, as seismologists 
were continually tweaking them to see if they could measure different types of 
movements.160 Complicating this was the relative discontent with the current 
theories of earth processes, the causes of earthquakes, and the material structure 
of the earth’s interior. It is difficult to find a seismologist who spoke about the 
most commonly accepted theory of the causes of earthquakes using absolutist 
terms. Oldham did not use definite language when referring to these theories.161 
He was not alone in his tentative acceptance of the theory. Milne was also 
cautious in his discussion of the underlying geophysical causes of earthquakes, 
saying that the current theories were “not unlikely” and “not impossible.”162  
According to the predominant theory that seismologists used, the earth 
was a cooling mass composed of three portions. A completely cooled outer skin 
of rock kept a constant temperature, while the second shell of rock, sitting 
underneath the shallow skin, was gradually cooling and contracting. A third 
“central mass” had not yet lost its heat, so it was still in a more viscous state.163 
As the second shell of rock gradually cooled, it contracted around the central 
mass. Somewhere between the superheated center and the cooling shell, there was 
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a level of no strain, where the tension of the central mass canceled out the tension 
of the shell.164 The two central portions of the earth, then, were cooling and 
contracting at a slow and gradual rate. The unyielding outermost skin, however, 
did not have its compression counteracted by tension, and it could not support its 
own weight. This meant that when the shell contracted, the space left between the 
shell and the skin would generate strain in the skin. Eventually, this strain would 
accumulate until it finally fractured under its own weight, causing a tectonic 
earthquake.165 Oldham also listed two other possible causes (although there were 
more than three accepted causes at the time, he only listed those which he thought 
were the most likely causes). Earthquakes could also be the result of rockfall in 
subterranean caves and volcanic activity that released the earth’s pent-up 
steam.166 Each supposed type of earthquake needed several types of seismographs 
to track it.  
But there was not much consensus on what a correct seismogram should 
look like, or even what type of data was best to collect. For several rockfall 
earthquakes, the only data that could be used was the sound it caused rather than 
the vibrations it produced. Volcanic earthquakes did not produce waves deep 
enough for the earthquake to register outside of the immediate vicinity, and 
seismographs were incapable of reading earthquakes that they sat directly on top 
of. Oldham acknowledged that this was the problem with the few seismographs 
set up in India. 
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The record vary much in value according to the nature of the instruments 
employed. In many cases these were in reality too delicate, and, under the 
influence of so exceptionally great a disturbance as was set up by this 
earthquake, the record of all but the beginning and end was lost.167 
 
Although seismologists thought that different wave types produced by tectonic 
earthquakes existed, they did not have (instrumental) proof, but still tried to 
measure them nonetheless by setting up multiple types of instruments to capture 
as much variation in movement as they could. 
Another problem was that the earth refused to be still. In 1920, 
seismologists still complained about near constant and unexplained microseisms 
that shook their seismographs, even in the absence of earthquakes.168 Ironically, 
even though seismographs were designed to register earth movement, instruments 
that registered too much earth movement interfered with tracking the ‘important’ 
terrestrial activity. Consequently, seismologists had to use seismographs that were 
less sensitive alongside their highly sensitive machines so that they could limit the 
number of tremors recorded.169 Isolating the waves that seismologists deemed 
relevant to seismology continued to be problematic. Often, these signals of an 
active earth made seismologists rely on each other to verify whether the tremors 
their instruments registered were worldwide events. They had to determine what 
earth movement to ignore, what warranted verification, and what counted as 
seismologically relevant. 
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As the instrument observers discovered, the sensitive instruments could 
not be set up just anywhere. Making a seismograph inscribe exclusively the 
earth’s own movement turned out to be remarkably difficult. Everything from a 
nearby factory to the moon affected the delicate instruments.170 In a beautifully 
ironic twist, the technologies that Oldham had used to observe the earthquake 
became problematic for seismographs. Trains, traffic, steamboats, buildings, and 
bridges all caused minute vibrations on the surface of the earth (but not the 
microseisms discussed previously), causing a seismograph to falsely register earth 
tremors.171 Scientists developed a few ways to solve these problems, but they 
usually involved altering the landscape. Some seismologists dug trenches around 
their instruments, sometimes 40-60 feet deep, to insulate them from the effects of 
human activities and inventions.172  
Setting up a seismograph network was also expensive, which made it 
especially difficult for colonial seismologists. In 1883, Oldham said about 
building several seismographs, that “the expenditure is not one that could be 
recommended to Government.”173 The cost of seismographs was a problem that 
the ISA recognized, and they even sponsored a prize for the best cheap 
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seismograph.174 Instead of asking the government for the funds, Oldham 
encouraged people to construct their own and instructed them in how to observe 
these makeshift seismographs.175 The nature of conducting seismological work, 
and especially work in colonies, necessitated a special variety of instruments as 
well. Oldham said that instruments used in colonies needed to be easy to 
transport, must not occupy a large amount of space, must not require special 
foundations, be inexpensive, run without much attention, be consistent and 
sensitive (but not too sensitive), and the “records should be capable of easy and 
rapid reproduction.”176 As Oldham said, European seismologists working in 
observatories might not see the value of such instruments, as they were not facing 
the same set of circumstances. Running an observatory with the most current, 
accurate, and expensive instruments was time consuming and cost intensive. 
Colonial seismologists did not have these luxuries, so their instruments should be 
made to fit their particular needs rather than the needs of, for example, 
‘Strassburg,’ one of the most important earthquake observatories.177  
Montessus de Ballore criticized using seismographs exclusively, since he 
believed that they missed important effects of earthquakes. According to him, 
“[s]eismology could not be confined to the observatory, for its evidence was 
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written in part on the face of the earth.”178 A later problem with observatories and 
seismographs that was not obvious at the turn of the century was the issue of 
national security. The ISA fell apart at the beginning of the first World War, and 
with World War II, “plans for a dense and truly global network of seismometers 
ha[d] failed in the face of objections that such surveillance would compromise 
national security.”179 Despite the idealistic portrayal of observatories and 
seismographs, the realities left the ideal mostly that - an ideal. As an observatory 
science, seismology started taking apart an earthquake as a disaster.  
Oldham’s Arguments 
Oldham refuted the arguments of macro-seismologists using examples 
from his own colonial work in India in an effort to push the field in a geophysical 
direction. His 1899 report argued that observational methods were unsuitable for 
colonies. He believed that this was unacceptable because of the necessary data 
that could only be obtained from countries outside of Europe. In his later work, he 
sought to prove that instruments were not simply a better alternative; they were an 
excellent option for seismology in Europe and colonies alike. Instruments, he 
believed, addressed the problems he encountered in conducting his colonial 
seismology.  
One of the most critical problems he identified in his work was the 
problem of working in India with the Indian people. India and its population were 
not conducive to conducting surveys, he asserted. However, the earthquake data 
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gathered from India was essential, as it was one of the key seismic zones, being 
near a mountain range, and any earthquake data from outside of Europe was 
critical to making seismology a universal science. Throughout his report, Oldham 
downplayed Indian contributions, disguised indigenous knowledge, and 
emphasized the lack of data. Through Oldham’s writing and remarks, readers of 
his report are given the impression that valuable data about the earthquake is 
inaccessible thanks to a lack of civilization and the harsh landscape of India. This 
colonial point of view provided micro-seismologists with better evidence for 
pushing for a network of instruments. As Clancey says, the seismologist Davison 
came away from Oldham's report feeling that the report was a "triumph of 
European science amid difficult local conditions."180 Oldham does not suggest 
measures that integrated indigenous knowledge, such as changing building style, 
replanting some of the forest in the lowlands, or creating a network of 
communications with the Garo and Khasi people. The only suggestions he 
offered, both in his earthquake report and the report that he compiled for his 
father, was to install seismographs across the subcontinent.181  
Cooperation from the local population was not a given in India. Local 
groups could be hostile to colonial efforts, or there could be a language barrier. 
Indians may have had different reactions than Europeans, so their reactions to 
earthquakes could not be trusted as seismological evidence. In addition to the 
population, the landscape and political situations posed problems. Observing 
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instruments in the safety of an observatory seemed like an easier and more 
efficient option. Human error plagued his report, and he blamed most of this on 
the lack of large settlements across Assam. The natural consequence of these 
realities, Oldham implied, was that observational seismology needed to be 
stripped down to a simplified version that did not yield data as rich as 
seismologists in Europe could produce. Observational seismology would always 
be less complete and thus less helpful due to the unique problems facing colonial 
seismologists. Colonial seismology was too critical to seismology as a field 
overall to be left to Mallet's methods or indigenous observations. Interestingly, he 
never suggested ways to overcome these individual challenges. Rather, the only 
good solution, Oldham argued, was the instrument network. Using instruments, he 
believed that he would be able to transcend the complications of places like India. 
Although he acknowledged the problems with the seismographs currently in 
India, and noted that human error could still enter in, he still placed his faith in 
instruments and seismology’s geophysical shift.  
Inadequate instruments would not be problematic enough to keep them 
from being the primary method of data gathering according to Oldham. In his 
later work, he continued to rely on instrumental data gathered during his 
earthquake survey to show the value of seismology as a geophysical science. In 
histories of seismology, Oldham is remembered as the geologist who discovered 
that there were three distinct types of seismic waves and provided the first 
evidence for the earth's core, which he calculated to be about 0.4 the radius of the 
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earth.182 Oldham’s faith in instruments did not lay solely with seismographs. He 
used a wide variety of instruments, of which only some were considered strictly 
earthquake-recording instruments, to track waves across the surface of and 
through the earth. Simultaneously, John Milne (1850-1913) was involved in 
setting up a sparse network of seismographs. Unfortunately, very few of the 
seismographs were sensitive enough to record anything but large quakes. It was 
not until later that Emil Wiechert (1861-1928) figured out how to dampen 
seismographs, which lessened the amount of excessive movement of the 
seismograph, decreasing the amount of seismograms recording movement that 
was non-tectonic in origin, that the instruments rendered more accurate results.183 
Despite the instrumental flaws, Oldham was confident enough in his 
measurements to challenge Rayleigh's theory of surface waves. Subsequently, 
Oldham got the credit as being the first discoverer, as he had provided 
instrumental data.  
Similarly, geologists and geophysicists for long had hypothesized about a 
liquid center of the earth. It was his measurements of earthquake waves, using 
instruments from around the globe, that earned him the recognition as the 
'discoverer' of the core of the earth. Echoing his opinions formed during his time 
in colonial India, he credited instruments in Europe, and a little bit of luck, in his 
discovery. 
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[They were] practically made possible by the fact that in 1906 there were 
two great earthquakes, both of which were large enough to give very 
complete records at distant stations; both of which originated at about the 
same distance from the group of seismological stations in Western Europe, 
but in such positions that the wave-paths differed radically in type.184  
 
The network of instruments, placed at strategic points in Europe, Asia, and the 
Americas, was what allowed Oldham to generate his measurements and 
conclusions. To Oldham, this was proof that showed how seismographs, placed 
across the earth, could give seismologists the material they needed to answer 
geophysical questions. Until instruments were invented, he said that seismologists 
did not have the tools to measure the interior of the earth. Instrumental 
seismology opened up the earth for exploration. ‘Confining’ exploration and 
theorization to the earth’s crust, Oldham suggested, was a fault in the discipline of 
geology, which instruments could finally remedy. 
Many theories of the earth have been propounded at different times: the 
central substance of the earth has been supposed to be fiery, fluid, solid, 
and gaseous in turn, till geologists have turned in despair from the subject, 
and become inclined to confine their attention to the outermost crust of the 
earth, leaving its centre as a playground for mathematicians. The object of 
this paper is not to introduce another speculation, but to point out that the 
subject is, at least partly, removed from the realm of speculation into that 
of knowledge by the instrument of research which the modern 
seismograph has placed in our hands. Just as the spectroscope opened up a 
new astronomy by enabling the astronomer to determine some of the 
constituents of which distant stars are composed, so the seismograph, 
recording the unfelt motion of distant earthquakes, enables us to see into 
the earth and determine its nature with as great a certainty, up to a certain 
point, as if we could drive a tunnel through it and take samples of the 
matter passed through.185 
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No matter how thorough his observational report, he was arguing, that only 
instruments could provide answers to geophysical questions. The course of 
Oldham's career demonstrated, as he hoped it would, why instrumental 
seismology was so valuable, and how it could be used to answer some of the 
fundamental questions of geophysics, such as what the interior of the earth looked 
like. All of this he attributed to instruments. These conclusions rebutted the 
macro-seismologists’ argument that inadequate instruments should not be used as 
the primary form of data. The seismograms were too variable and were affected 
by too many outside influences to be as dependable as a seismologist's 
observational data. However, Oldham showed (although his proofs were not 
uncontested)186 that imperfect instruments, some not even intended for 
seismology, could provide answers to the questions that were now the most 
important for geophysicists. 
 Oldham’s insistence on using instruments as the primary source of data in 
seismology was a defining characteristic of his seismology. His opinions about 
the methods of seismology and the benefits of instrumentalizing seismology were 
formed in response to his work as a colonial seismologist. Although he never 
condemned observational seismologists and their methods outright, his arguments 
placed him squarely on the side of the geophysicists. If seismologists wanted a 
universal science, especially including the colonies, the best course of action that 
mitigated the problems of conducting seismological surveys in a colony was to 
                                                 
186 Agnew, “History of Seismology,” 7.  
88 
turn to instruments, regardless of their flaws, and invest time and effort into 
making them more accessible.  
 Oldham ended up with the reputation he had hoped for. His work was 
quickly influential in seismology and geology. His report, along with his work on 
the center of the earth,  was what he was best known for.187 In retrospect, 
seismologists labeled it "quite the most valuable work prepared up to that time"188 
and some gave the overly generous evaluation that his report "laid the foundation 
of modern seismological studies [and] will remain forever a classic 
contribution."189 Suess used his work in theorizing about the composition of the 
earth and the origins of mountains.190 Due to his status as an important 
geophysicist, Oldham later weighed in on the debate about Wegener's plate 
tectonic theory.191 In obituaries, Oldham was contrasted with Mallet, showing his 
report as an example of the next step in seismology between Mallet and the 'new' 
seismology.192 He also trained other seismologist-geologists working in India. 
Charles Stewart Middlemiss (1859-1945), who compiled the report on the 1905 
Kangra Earthquake, attributed his methodology to Oldham's training.193 Along 
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with being remembered as an important seismologist, he is also celebrated as a 
scientist who overcame problematic circumstances in colonies, and used 
instruments to prove important geophysical theories. He was the seismologist who 
pressed on 'despite' the difficulties of colonial seismology. As he wanted to do, he 
demonstrated the necessity of colonial data being gathered by instrument through 
his work. The primary questions he hoped to answer, the geophysical, were the 
ones he was remembered for.   
Japan, the Successful Alternative 
Seismologists working in Japan faced very similar situations as Oldham 
did in India. Their choices, however, reveal a very different direction Oldham 
could have taken. Although I provide it as an alternative model, it is important to 
keep in mind other differences that influenced their decisions. First of all, Japan 
was not Britain’s colony, so the Japanese government could decide on the 
measures that would best suit Japan, rather than considering whether their work 
would primarily benefit Great Britain. Japanese seismologists had as much 
agency in constructing Japanese seismology as Milne did. Despite the heavy 
influence from Britain through Milne and other seismologists, Japanese 
seismologists determined that the most pressing issues were learning how to 
predict earthquakes and learning how to build structures that resisted seismic 
shocks.194 Although Japan was not a colonial outpost, seismologists valued the 
data from Japan because it fell outside of Europe’s geography. The Japanese 
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government decided to form the Imperial Earthquake Investigation Committee in 
1892, hiring an initial thirteen seismologists, engineers, and scientists from other 
disciplines.195 The government provided yearly funding for the committee. 
Oldham, on the other hand, was the only seismologist working in India, and only 
initially had the help of a few other geologists for the survey. They also had poor 
funding. The purposes of the committees were different. Oldham was instructed 
to write a report from a ‘scientific’ point of view, which meant that he was not 
supposed to record deaths or near-deaths and was not instructed to predict 
earthquakes.196 In addition to the special committee, the Japanese also included 
seismology in their education programs. This was absent in India, as the teaching 
of geology in universities was already a controversial practice.197 Seismologists 
and engineers in Japan built and tested several seismographs, something that was 
not done in India. Although Oldham had explained how to construct some simple 
seismographs in India, the government overall did not take an interest in funding 
seismograph development.  
Seismologists in both locations had difficulty in collecting data from the 
public. In India, Oldham required an interpreter and many of the people he 
conversed with would have been hostile to the colonial government. In Japan, 
collecting reports from the public was difficult because Japan experienced so 
many earthquakes, and Milne seems to have given up on collecting after the 1880 
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earthquake.198 Overall, Japanese seismologists had the independent government, 
funding, organization, and directives to do seismological research that was absent 
in colonial India. But two particularly revealing differences cannot be explained 
away by systemic differences. Japanese seismologists believed in the social 
obligations of seismology and valued public contributions, at least initially.   
Milne and Fusakichi Ōmori (1868-1923), two of the most important 
seismologists working in Japan, handled the question of public responsibility and 
public engagement differently. They did not align themselves with either the 
macro or micro-seismologists. Even though there were seismologists that fit 
squarely in one camp or the other (Gerland is an example of this, as he “dismissed 
outright all the work his colleagues were doing to avert future disasters - the 
mapping of seismic intensity, the location of fault lines, the study of architectural 
damage.”199), several of the seismologists fell somewhere in a middle ground. 
Coen’s dichotomy is misleadingly simple; most seismologists believed that both 
fieldwork and observatory work were necessary, that instrument readings filled in 
the gaping holes in observational seismology’s methodology, and that 
seismologists had an obligation to identify areas of increased vulnerability and 
suggest measures to mitigate the disastrous effects of earthquakes on humans. 
Milne and Ōmori are perhaps the most famous example of this. They advocated 
for the use of instruments primarily, and, when faced with the problems of 
conducting observational seismology in Japan, mostly abandoned the 
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observational technique. But their seismology was anything but ‘purely 
intellectual.’ Every bit of their research had practical applications, from building 
more efficient structures (which they tested on machines) to laying undersea 
telegraph cables. Both actively favored a collaborative approach, working with 
and training Japanese students and seismologists to come up with methods, 
instruments, and an architectural style most suitable for Japan. When comparing 
Japan’s seismology with India’s, Clancey says that,  
To Davison, areas where no observations could be obtained map land 
inhabited by ignorant or illiterate tribes. Ōmori maps them, in the Japanese 
context, as areas of indigenous skill and stability. To Davison, the work of 
the Indian Geological Survey is a triumph or European science amid 
difficult local conditions. To Ōmori, isoseismal lines trace out the failure 
of European science to come to terms with unexpected local difficulties.200  
 
Although this misrepresents Oldham’s work, it captures the differences between 
their two methods. Oldham, Ōmori, and Milne all addressed the problem of 
making seismology across the globe comparable the same way. Each believed that 
seismographs would allow scientists from all over the world to assess the 
earthquakes by the same standards. Clancey recognized, however, that valuing 
seismographs above communication with the local population was a colonial 
practice. “Object-based or instrumental seismology was...simultaneously a set of 
colonizing practices and a potentially powerful commentary on the colonial 
project itself. As long as Ōmori relied solely on physical markers, questions about 
the reliability of Japanese witnessing would never be raised.”201  
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The primary difference lay in the function they imagined these 
seismographs served. Oldham wanted the entire discipline to be geophysical in 
nature and used colonial impediments to prove the necessity of instruments. Milne 
and Ōmori used seismographs as a way to overcome some of the regional 
variations between Japan and the West, but also used them to show that they 
could be beneficial to engineering, architecture, and prediction. In addition, 
Ōmori and Milne learned to read the Japanese landscape and architecture for 
earthquake data, even going so far as to compare Japanese architecture with 
seismological instruments, while Oldham labeled the Indian architecture and 
society problematic for earthquake observations.202 
Conclusion 
To both micro and macro-seismologists, the necessity of data from 
numerous points around the world was indisputable. But colonies and their 
earthquakes were hotly contested spaces in the seismological debates at the end of 
the nineteenth century. Which types of information from these places were 
valuable to the seismological debates held in Europe? What were the social 
obligations to those who lived in these areas? What, if anything, should scientists 
learn from local people? What were the best ways to address the discrepancies 
between different points on the globe? And how was relevant evidence best 
collected from these sites? Seismologists working in colonies were in a uniquely 
powerful position to answer these questions. Their decisions and 
recommendations, as exhibited in their reports, were far from an unbiased reading 
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of the facts. Each report was an argument for how to answer these questions, and 
the conclusions suggested by the authors were informed by both social and 
physical considerations. In India’s case, Oldham presented an argument that 
pointed to the inadequacy of observational seismology in the colonies. The 
barriers to conducting adequate and informative surveys, his report suggested, 
were too problematic to overcome with simple adjustments to the methodology. 
In areas of the world that had even less European structures and infrastructures, 
seismology would be impossible, and the potential seismic data would be lost. 
Instruments were the best solution. Not only could they transcend the problems of 
colonial seismology, they could also give scientists evidence for unsolved 
mysteries of the earth’s center.  
Despite trying to eliminate the ‘colonial’ from colonial seismology, 
Oldham’s suggested solutions replicated many of the colonial hierarchies of 
power. It further insulated Europeans from the various peoples they worked 
among. In instrumental seismology, Indian voices were again silenced, their 
aseismic architecture overlooked, and their knowledge and methods of 
observation rendered frivolous while instruments’ contested inscriptions were 
elevated. As Oldham was trying to look deeper into the earth, the Indians, who 
only occasionally showed up in his report, began to fade completely from view. 
Seismographs could track and measure the earth’s waves, but the disastrous 
nature of an earthquake was reduced to a simple natural process that exposed the 
unseeable and hid the obvious.  
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It is unclear how these arguments would have played out without the 
World Wars. While seismologists were still making sense of these questions, the 
data, and the instruments, World War I interrupted. Seismology and its global 
networks were pushed down the list of priorities, and instrumental seismology lost 
its “purely intellectual” persona in favor of a science that could serve the nation. 
When seismologists revisited these questions, they were also dealing with new 
seismic readings, a new theory of how the earth worked, and new war 
technologies that they could use. Still, seismologists look back on this moment, 
the rocky transition from observational to instrumental, as the foundation of a 
truly modern seismology. Missing in this foundation myth are the questions of 
responsibility, the question of the purpose of seismology, and the continuing 
influence of colonialism.  
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Chapter 4: Conclusion 
Oldham did not stay long in India after he published his report, returning 
to Great Britain in 1904. He had recently been passed over for promotion but had 
also contracted sprue, which he died from in 1936. After he returned to Europe, 
Oldham continued to write and publish papers on earthquakes, during which time 
he compiled his seismograph inscriptions to show that the earth had a viscous 
core and that there were three distinct types of earthquake waves. 203 These two 
discoveries earned him a Lyell Medal (1908) and the presidency of the Geological 
Society (1920-22), as well as a place on history of seismology timelines. As one 
such entry describes him, “He was a geologist with little passion yet was the first 
to discover p-waves and s-waves in seismograms. He also discovered the Earth’s 
core using seismic waves.”204 Undoubtedly, his experience in India shaped the 
way he thought of and wrote about seismology. He decided that a universal 
seismology would need to be an instrumental seismology, and the discipline 
would need to focus its attention on the interior of the earth rather than the effects 
on the surface. As he said, his seismology “must savour of cold-bloodedness; yet 
the human suffering will pass [and] the ruined cities will be rebuilt.”205 
Globalization, and especially colonialism, had shaken the tenets of 
seismology. Geophysicists’ solutions, and the resulting ‘new’ seismology, was a 
reaction to the application of seismology to locations across the world, rather than 
                                                 
203 Middlemiss, “Richard Dixon Oldham,” ciii-cvi. 
204 "The History of Seismology," Preceden. 
https://www.preceden.com/timelines/40019-the-history-of-seismology.  
205 R. D. Oldham, “The Italian Earthquake of December 28, 1908,” The 
Geographical Journal 33, no. 2 (February 1909): 185. 
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just in European cities. Encountering new problems and types of evidence, 
seismologists had to make a decision about how seismology needed to change to 
be a universal science. The result was an instrumentalist shift in the discipline. 
This shift was not simply adding instruments to the already existing framework; 
seismologists had to restructure what seismology was a science of, what counted 
as credible evidence, and who could do the observing. It privileged one form of 
knowing, instrument inscriptions, over the human experience and secondary 
effects.  
Oldham, in his report, selected what counted as usable evidence, and 
usually this meant ignoring the Indian evidence of testimonies, architecture, and 
observation techniques. In the Assam example, Indians were not agents in 
constructing a universal seismology; when included, they serve merely as 
informants rather than as active and educated partners in knowledge-making. By 
examining the Japanese case, where Japanese and British seismologists worked 
together to create a hybrid seismology, we can see that suppressing indigenous 
knowledge is not inherent in instrumental seismology. However, Oldham framed 
the geophysical turn as incompatible with non-European knowledge. Being one of 
the few sources from a colonial ‘outpost,’ Oldham’s arguments were influential in 
creating a universal science. This universal science had to be able to transcend 
place and be applicable anywhere. Embedded in these assumptions, however, are 
the assumptions of the uselessness of Indian (and other non-European) knowledge 
and the invisibility of the experiencers. The distrust of indigenous people was an 
issue that did not have to be resolved in the new seismology. The ‘modern’ 
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seismology that emerged from this crucible reproduced the invisibility of the 
colonized and of their knowledge.  
Although instruments helped seismologists gather data quickly, made their 
data comparable to other seismologists’, and simultaneously observe seismic 
events from around the world, transitioning to an instrumental seismology was 
problematic. The most important problem was that, despite seismologists’ ample 
praise of instruments, there was no settled epistemology to transition to. There 
was not much consensus about what seismographs measured, what they were 
supposed to measure, how much of it to measure, and whether seismograms 
accurately inscribed what they were supposed to record. Colonial seismology also 
made demands on the construction of the instruments, including requiring 
inexpensive, portable designs. Consequently, hundreds of types of seismographs 
existed, matched by hundreds of types of data that they recorded. The debate was 
not between two established types of seismology. It was between an established, 
but inadequate, method and a method currently in production. As seismologists 
converted to instrumental seismology, they contributed to shaping the amorphous 
epistemology. Questionable as this new seismology was, Oldham argued that 
unreliable instruments were less problematic than unreliable people, proving it 
through his later publications. He put his faith in the improvement of instruments 
rather than the education of the public.  
The instrumental turn in seismology was a very deliberate, contested 
change, a story antithetical to the traditional narrative of the development of 
modern seismology. Colonial seismologists directly affected this change, 
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providing evidence and arguing for the necessity of instruments. Seismological 
theories of the earth shifted during the first world war, but Oldham’s argument 
captures the thoughts and attitudes of many seismologists that brought ‘new’ 
geophysical seismology to the forefront of the discipline. It relied on instruments 
and data, using technology and methods that were nowhere near closure. Like 
Mallet’s Europe-bound methodology, Oldham’s version of a ‘new’ seismology 
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